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ABSTRACT 
Debt contracts contain accounting-based covenants that could be affected by changes 
in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). There are three types of contractual 
treatment of GAAP changes: excluding GAAP changes (frozen GAAP); incorporating GAAP 
changes (floating GAAP); and incorporating changes unless either the borrower or the lenders 
request a freeze (frozen-on-request GAAP). Motivated by the recent increase and current 
prevalence of frozen-on-request GAAP, I examine whether this type is more useful in 
promoting debt contracting efficiency than the other two by collecting a large sample of private 
debt contracts. I use false positives and false negatives as proxies for debt contracting efficiency 
and find significantly lower false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP 
than under frozen and floating GAAP after controlling for self-selection bias. The reductions 
in false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP could be attributable to 
its advantages in incorporating and excluding GAAP changes and in reducing renegotiation 
costs and facilitating renegotiations. I also find that the reductions become weak during 
financial crisis and when borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences towards GAAP 
changes. My dissertation provides new evidence on the role of accounting standards and GAAP 
provision designs in improving debt contracting efficiency. 
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Debt contracts are incomplete as it is difficult to forecast all future events that may 
occur and all actions that are appropriate in these events. Accounting-based covenants are used 
to mitigate the contractual incompleteness by serving as “…a measurement system that maps 
states of the world into accounting numbers and thus facilitates state contingent control 
allocation…” (Christensen and Nikolaev 2017, page 22). However, generally accepted 
accounting standards (GAAP) evolve over time as evidenced by the establishment of new rules 
and the improvement in existing rules by standard-setting bodies. The evolving GAAP could 
affect covenant calculations and thereby affect borrowers’ compliance with covenants and 
control right allocations. An example is a change in lease accounting that requires the 
recognition of operating leases on the balance sheet (FASB Topic 842). This new standard could 
substantially change borrowers’ balance-sheet profile and trigger the violation of affected 
covenants1, and therefore it has been widely discussed among practitioners and in the media.2 
The FASB frequently issues accounting standards updates3 and the private debt is an important 
 
1 Although in most cases lenders will grant a waiver, the waiver is not totally free and covenant violations are 
costly to borrowers. Prior studies such as Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) and Chava and Roberts (2008) find that 
after debt covenant violations, lenders will intervene in borrowers’ operating, financing, and investment activities 
and corporate governance. In addition to the increased lenders’ control, borrowers’ refinancing costs and 
restructuring costs will also increase (Beneish and Press 1993). 
2 See http://ww2.cfo.com/gaap-ifrs/2014/02/lease-accounting-changes-jar-bank-covenants/. 
    Another anecdotal example of accounting changes impacting covenants is the change in the classification of 
warranty. As mentioned in ARTISTdirect Inc.’s 10-Q for June 30, 2008: “Due to the accounting classification of 
the warranty issued in conjunction with the Senior Financing and the Sub-Debt Financing as a current liability in 
accordance with SFAS No. 133 and EITF 00-19, the Company was not in compliance with certain of these 
financial covenants at December 31, 2005. On April 7, 2006, the lenders provided waivers with respect to such 
past events of default under the Senior Notes and amended their loan documents such that the warrant liability 
and any change thereto in future periods will not affect future covenant”. 
3 Based on the accounting standards updates (including improvements and amendments to existing standards) 




source of firm capital4, leading borrowers and lenders to be frequently confronted with the 
question on how to address the impact of GAAP changes on accounting-based covenants. In 
private debt contracts, there are three types of GAAP provisions that are used to address this 
impact.5 I investigate the effect of the three types on debt contracting efficiency. 
The first type is frozen GAAP, which means for the purpose of determining covenant 
compliance, the borrower will apply GAAP in effect on the closing date of the contract 
throughout the term.6 This type reduces the risk underlying GAAP changes at the expense of 
restricting possible benefits of improved GAAP and keeping multiple sets of accounting books. 
The second type is floating GAAP that incorporates future GAAP changes into covenant 
calculations. This type benefits from improved GAAP but may worsen contracts if GAAP 
changes hinder the covenants’ ability to capture the state of nature or the changes trigger 
inadvertent covenant violations. The third is frozen-on-request GAAP, where floating GAAP 
is used until either the borrower or the lenders request the continued use of GAAP in effect 
immediately before the request. This type can incorporate improved GAAP and allow the 
elimination of GAAP changes that hinder the covenants’ ability to capture the state of nature, 
but granting an option to freeze GAAP changes is not always good for debt contracting 
efficiency.  
Prior studies (e.g., Leftwich 1983; EL-Gazzar and Pastena 1990; Mohrman 1993, 1996; 
 
4 The size of U.S. commercial and industrial loans reached $2.35 trillion in July 2019 based on the statistics from 
the Federal Reserve System (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BUSLOANS). 
5  My dissertation focuses on mandatory GAAP changes. As mandatory changes are imposed to borrowers 
externally, the impact of GAAP provision types on debt contracting efficiency depends on the types of GAAP 
provisions. However, in the setting of voluntary changes, the impact depends on both the types of GAAP 
provisions and borrowers’ choice in the adoption of voluntary changes. 
6 Mohrman (1996) uses the term “fixed GAAP” provisions to refer to “the provisions that ensure that the terms of 
the contract will be unaffected by future accounting method changes” (page 79). 
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Darrough and Deng 2017) focus on frozen versus floating GAAP. There is little evidence on 
the use of frozen-on-request GAAP partly because this type was regarded as one type of frozen 
GAAP and only became common within the last decade.7 I collect 18,923 private debt contracts 
from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) and find that 
frozen-on-request GAAP increased from 7.4% in 1996 to 66.5% in 2017 and is currently the 
most prevalent GAAP provision type (see Figure 1 Panel A).  
Motivated by the significant increase in its use, I explore whether frozen-on-request 
GAAP can better address the impact of GAAP changes on debt covenants than frozen and 
floating GAAP and therefore promote debt contracting efficiency. To capture the efficiency of 
GAAP provisions in addressing the impact of GAAP changes, I adopt Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, 
and Venugopalan (2009)’s definition of debt contracting efficiency that minimizes the errors 
due to false alarms and missed early warnings.  Based on this definition, I use two proxies for 
debt contracting efficiency, false positives (i.e., covenant violations occur when borrowers’ 
creditworthiness does not deteriorate below the original intent of thresholds) and false 
negatives (i.e., covenant violations do not occur when borrowers’ creditworthiness deteriorates 
below the original intent of thresholds). 
To develop my predictions about false positives and false negatives under the three 
types of GAAP provisions, I first consider a simplified case before contract renegotiations for 
subsequent accounting changes. I assume that borrowers care more about the effect of GAAP 
changes on covenant tightness while lenders care more about the effect on debt contracting 
 
7 Most studies combine frozen-on-request GAAP contracts with frozen GAAP. The exception is the Internet 
Appendix of Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), which separates frozen-on-request GAAP from frozen GAAP and 
shows that the use of frozen-on-request GAAP increased significantly from 1994 to 2005. 
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efficiency. Under frozen-on-request GAAP, GAAP changes detrimental to debt contracting 
efficiency are excluded from covenant calculations by lenders, but GAAP changes beneficial 
to debt contracting efficiency are not necessarily incorporated into covenant calculations 
because borrowers could request to freeze GAAP changes beneficial to efficiency but 
tightening covenants. For example, the new GAAP on consolidation of variable interest entities 
helps reflect the true financial position and performance but tightens covenants such as the 
maximum leverage and the minimum earnings, and therefore borrowers have incentives to 
reject this GAAP change. Although borrowers could reject GAAP changes beneficial to 
efficiency, frozen-on-request GAAP remains more useful in capturing borrowers’ state than 
frozen and floating GAAP because frozen GAAP excludes all GAAP changes and floating 
GAAP incorporates all GAAP changes. That means compared to frozen and floating GAAP, 
frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in reducing false positives and false negatives before 
contract renegotiations. 
Next, I consider the case where renegotiation costs are trivial. Here, GAAP changes can 
always be renegotiated away at trivial costs, implying that there would be no difference in false 
positives and false negatives under the three types of GAAP provisions. Finally, I consider the 
more typical scenario where renegotiation costs are non-trivial. Frozen-on-request GAAP saves 
renegotiation costs and facilitates renegotiations and thereby better restores the ex-post 
efficiency, compared to frozen and floating GAAP. This is because under frozen-on-request 
GAAP, no renegotiation is needed when borrowers and lenders have the same preference 
towards GAAP changes, and the two parties cannot reject renegotiations when they have 
conflicting preferences. The tension arises if borrowers abuse renegotiations under frozen-on-
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request GAAP to push lenders to agree to reject GAAP changes beneficial to efficiency but 
tightening covenants. Jointly considering frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages in improving 
efficiency before renegotiations and restoring the ex-post efficiency after renegotiations, I 
expect lower false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP than under 
frozen and floating GAAP.  
To empirically test my expectations, I employ Heckman (1979)’s selection model to 
mitigate the concerns on self-selection bias. I construct a choice model of frozen-on-request 
GAAP and find that the use of this type depends on the relative negotiation power of borrowers 
and lenders, the cost of keeping multiple sets of accounting books, renegotiation costs, 
borrowers’ financial conservatism, and the protection of collateral specified in debt contracts. 
In the outcome model, I apply two measures of false positives following Demerjian, 
Donovan, and Lewis-Western (2020). First, I identify false positives as the situation where 
borrowers have positive abnormal stock returns in one preceding quarter and the concurrent 
quarter but report covenant violations in the concurrent quarter. Second, I define false positives 
as an alternative situation where borrowers have credit rating upgrades in one year prior to 
covenant violations. For both measures, I find that facilities with frozen-on-request GAAP are 
less likely to experience false positives than facilities with frozen and floating GAAP. I find 
similar results for a probit regression as a robustness test of Heckman model, and for the 
Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Firth 1993) that is used to correct for the 
likelihood of rare events. 
I measure false negatives as the number of months between the first negative stock price 
shock and the first covenant violation following the shock or the sample ending/loan maturity 
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if there is no covenant violation (Zhang 2008). The smaller the number of months, the lower 
the false negatives. I collect a sample of 1,322 facilities that experience at least one negative 
stock price shock between the facility initiation and the sample ending or the maturity dates. 
Consistent with my prediction, the number of months under facilities with frozen-on-request 
GAAP is smaller relative to facilities with frozen and floating GAAP, indicating lower false 
negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP. 
Next, I consider the variation in accounting standard setting activities. I expect that the 
above advantages of frozen-on-request GAAP in reducing false positives and false negatives 
are greater when significant accounting changes relevant for financial covenants occur. I 
identify fifteen Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) that are the most relevant 
standards to covenants for my sample period, and establish criteria to select affected firms for 
each SFAS. I then compare the affected firms’ false positives and false negatives in the three 
years before versus after effective dates. Consistent with my expectation, the reductions in false 
positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP are more pronounced in the post 
period.  
To test the role of reduced renegotiation costs and renegotiation facilitation in helping 
frozen-on-request GAAP improve debt contracting efficiency, I split frozen-on-request GAAP 
into two types (1) GAAP without renegotiation (i.e., frozen-on-request GAAP provisions that 
do not mention renegotiations), and (2) GAAP with renegotiation (i.e., frozen-on-request 
GAAP provisions that require renegotiations) (see examples in Appendix I). The former type 
is more useful in reducing false positives by reducing renegotiation costs, and the latter type is 
more useful in reducing false negatives by facilitating renegotiations. Thus, I argue and 
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document that the reductions in false positives under frozen-on-request GAAP without 
renegotiation are more pronounced than with renegotiation, and the reductions in false 
negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation are more pronounced than without. 
In the additional analyses, I identify two scenarios where frozen-on-request GAAP 
becomes less useful: during the financial crisis when lenders also care more about covenant 
tightness; and, when borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences towards GAAP 
changes. In the two scenarios, I document that false positives under frozen-on-request GAAP 
are not significantly lower than those under frozen and floating GAAP.  
I also conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the robustness of my 
findings. Specifically, I construct a new measure of false positives based on bond returns to 
mitigate concerns of using stock returns as a proxy for borrowers’ creditworthiness. Similar to 
the results based on stock returns, I find lower false positives under frozen-on-request GAAP 
with this new measure. To mitigate the concern that my results of false negatives are sensitive 
to the cutoff used to identify the negative stock price shock, I use an alternative cutoff and find 
robust results based on the new cutoff. Further, I examine the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP 
on loan spreads based on agency theory and find lower spreads under frozen-on-request GAAP 
than under frozen and floating GAAP, supporting my primary findings to some extent. Finally, 
I conduct robustness tests of multicollinearity in Heckman’s selection model following the 
suggestions from Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012), and my results remain unchanged. 
My dissertation advances the literature on the GAAP provisions in debt contracts in two 
ways. First, although frozen-on-request GAAP has been the dominant GAAP provision type in 
recent years, prior studies have focused mainly on frozen and floating GAAP only, with the 
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exception of Christensen and Nikolaev (2017) who provide some preliminary evidence on the 
determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP. To my knowledge, my study is the first systematic 
study on frozen-on-request GAAP. I identify new determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP 
including the relative negotiation power of borrowers and lenders, borrowers’ financial 
reporting complexity, the number of lenders and the number of lenders squared, borrowers’ 
conservatism, the number of covenants, and the number of GAAP changes. These determinants 
are nontrivial and able to explain the different trends in the three GAAP provision types, 
extending Christensen and Nikolaev (2017).  
Second, while Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002) test the effect of GAAP provisions 
on cost of capital, a proxy for debt contracting efficiency, I examine the effect on false positives 
and false negatives. These direct measures capture the effect of GAAP provisions and are an 
unexplored but fundamental consequence. I provide substantial evidence that frozen-on-
request GAAP has advantages in incorporating and excluding GAAP changes and in reducing 
renegotiation costs and facilitating renegotiations, and therefore reduces false positives and 
false negatives. Moreover, I categorize the scenarios where frozen-on-request GAAP is more 
useful in reducing false positives and false negatives, and the scenarios where frozen-on-
request GAAP may not be more useful. Overall, my findings suggest that frozen-on-request 
GAAP can better address the impact of GAAP changes on debt covenants and therefore is more 
useful in improving debt contracting efficiency. 
More broadly, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the debt contracting 
efficiency role of accounting information. The incorporation and exclusion of GAAP changes 
under frozen-on-request GAAP increase the effectiveness of debt covenants in allocating state-
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contingent control rights and thus improve debt contracting efficiency. I also show that the 
improvement is more pronounced when significant accounting changes relevant for covenants 
occur. Collectively, my findings shed new lights on the role of GAAP changes in improving 
debt contracting efficiency, and respond to Christensen, Nikolaev, and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2016)’s call for research on the role of accounting standards in debt contracting.  
My findings should be of interest to practitioners by illustrating how the ex-ante choice 
of GAAP provisions helps to address the impact of evolving GAAP on debt covenants. To 
standard setters, if GAAP changes substantially affect covenant calculations, they would 
receive a large number of comment letters related to how to address the impact of the GAAP 
changes on covenant compliance. As a response to the comment letters, standard setters may 
need to extend the effective dates of the GAAP changes to permit existing debts to expire. My 
findings can provide them with another solution to respond to such comment letters and 
therefore help accelerate the adoption of GAAP changes.    
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of relevant literature. Chapter 3 develops research hypotheses. Chapter 4 outlines the sample 
construction and research models. Chapter 5 presents descriptive statistics and main results. In 











In this chapter, I introduce two main themes in prior studies that are relevant to this 
dissertation: debt contracting efficiency and GAAP provisions in debt contracts. The first part 
of the review (Section 2.2) describes the definitions of debt contracting efficiency under agency 
theory and incomplete contracting theory, and analyzes the role of accounting in improving 
debt contracting efficiency. The second part (Section 2.3) begins with a review of the 
determinants of GAAP provisions and follows with a discussion of the effect of GAAP 
provisions on debt contracting efficiency, which leads to my choice of the definition of debt 
contracting efficiency. This part concludes with my measure of debt contracting efficiency, 
false positives and false negatives, and highlights the main contribution of this dissertation by 
investigating the effect on false positives and false negatives, an unexplored consequence of 
GAAP provisions.  
2.2 Debt Contracting Efficiency 
2.2.1 Definition 
Debt contracting efficiency is not often defined in prior studies. In Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990), contracting efficiency means the maximization of firm value. Similarly, 
Christensen et al. (2016) define it as the total value or joint surplus that can be realized by 
modifying contracts, and explain this definition based on agency theory and incomplete 
contracting theory.  
More specifically, in agency theory, the efficiency gain is from reducing contracting 
11 
 
costs such as agency costs. Smith and Warner (1979) summarize four types of agency conflicts 
between borrowers and lenders: borrowers’ incentives to increase dividend payments, 
borrowers’ incentives to raise new debt capital, borrowers’ asset substitution behavior, and 
borrowers’ incentives to under-invest. By reducing these agency conflicts, debt contracting 
efficiency can be improved evidenced by a low cost of debt capital. 
 Incomplete contracting theory posits that control rights should be allocated to the party 
whose decisions contribute more to the joint surplus. In the debt contracting setting, when 
borrowers are in good state (i.e., they do not violate covenants), they keep control rights 
because they have incentives to maximize monetary return and nonmonetary private benefits, 
which result in the maximum of future cash flows payable to lenders. When borrowers are in 
bad state (i.e., they violate covenants), control rights should be allocated to lenders because 
borrowers are more likely to sacrifice lenders’ interests and take inefficient actions such as the 
continuation of bad projects to maximize their own nonmonetary private benefits (Aghion and 
Bolton 1992). The enhanced state-contingent allocation of control rights increases debt 
contracting efficiency. The definition of debt contracting efficiency under incomplete 
contracting theory is summarized by Gigler et al. (2009) that “the optimal debt arrangement 
minimizes the sum of the expected opportunity costs arising from two kinds of decision errors: 
errors due to false alarms and errors due to undue optimism. These errors are analogous to the 
Type I and Type II decision errors that arise in any binary decision setting” (page 770). This 
definition is similar to the liquidation efficiency in Jiang (2012) and Li (2013) that a project is 
liquidated whenever the expected project return is smaller than the liquidation value and 
continued whenever the expected project return is larger than the liquidation value. 
12 
 
The main differences between the two theories include: 1) Opportunistic behavior is 
addressed by shaping borrowers’ incentives under agency theory and by allocating control 
rights under incomplete contracting theory; 2) Agency theory focuses on only borrowers’ 
opportunism but incomplete contracting theory considers the opportunism of both borrowers 
and lenders; and 3) Contract renegotiation is a central element under incomplete contracting 
theory but is not considered under agency theory (Christensen et al. 2016). 
2.2.2 The Role of Accounting in Improving Debt Contracting Efficiency 
Accounting plays two main roles in debt contracting (see Christensen et al. 2016 and 
Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010 for a review). First, accounting information reduces 
information asymmetry between borrowers and existing and potential lenders and therefore can 
serve as a screening tool. Second, accounting variables are used as parameters in debt 
covenants. Under agency theory, covenants are used to facilitate bonding and monitoring 
activities and thus reduce agency costs. For example, the maximum dividend payment covenant 
and maximum leverage covenant can restrict borrowers’ incentives to increase dividend 
payments and issue additional debt, aligning borrowers’ and lenders’ interests. Under 
incomplete contracting theory, covenants are used to capture the state of nature and therefore 
facilitate the control right allocations contingent on the state. The two roles are the two 
mechanisms via which accounting information improves debt contracting efficiency, one key 
notion in positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1979, and 1990). 
Based on positive accounting theory, a stream of literature on the role of accounting 
information in debt contracting efficiency has emerged. This stream of literature explores the 
association between accounting information and debt contracts including:  
13 
 
1) Conservatism and loan characteristics. Watts (2003) posits that debt contracts 
increase lenders’ demands for accounting conservatism to curb borrowers’ ability to maximize 
their own interests at the expense of lenders’ interests. Existing studies document the positive 
association between accounting conservatism and debt contracts. For example, Wittenberg-
Moerman (2008) finds that accounting conservatism reduces the bid-ask spread. Ball, Robin, 
and Sadka (2008) find that the debt market rather than the equity market is positively associated 
with conditional conservatism, suggesting that the demands for conservatism are mainly from 
the debt market. Nikolaev (2010) finds a positive association between the number of debt 
covenants and accounting conservatism, and interprets the results as covenant-induced 
demands for conservatism. In addition to the number of covenants, Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) 
show that covenant definition adjustments, a term explained below, increase with the demands 
for conservatism, implying that covenants are adjusted to accommodate lenders’ demands for 
conservatism. However, the positive association is not supported by Gigler et al. (2009) who 
construct a model of debt covenants and find that accounting conservatism decreases debt 
contracting efficiency. 
2) Covenant definition adjustments. Although debt covenants are based on accounting 
variables, their definitions may be adjusted and different from GAAP definitions, a term called 
covenant definition adjustments. The purpose of the adjustments is to improve the debt 
contracting efficiency of accounting information. Li (2010) investigates the definition of 
earnings covenants and finds the removal of transitory components of earnings. Beatty, Cheng, 
and Zach (2019) show that non-recurring items that are (not) informative of borrowers’ future 
performance are more (less) likely to be incorporated into covenant calculations. Different from 
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those studies focusing on the inputs of covenant definitions, Dyreng, Vashishtha, and Weber 
(2017) explore the realization of covenant definitions and find that compared to GAAP 
earnings, earnings covenants are more predictive of borrowers’ future cash flow. The main 
takeaway from this stream of literature is that covenant definitions are adjusted to improve 
covenants’ ability to capture borrowers’ state of nature. 
3) The effect of specific accounting changes or general standard changes on covenant 
choices. For example, SFAS 141 and 142 replace the goodwill amortization by impairment 
testing. The goodwill impairment is a non-recurring item that may lack cash flow predictive 
ability and is subject to borrowers’ manipulations. As a result, after the adoption of these two 
GAAP changes the use of tangible net worth covenant increases while the use of net worth 
covenant decreases (Frankel, Seethamraju, and Zach 2008). A broad change in accounting 
standards over time has been FASB’s shift from an income statement approach to a balance 
sheet approach in developing new standards. The conceptual focus on balance sheet could 
introduce measurement errors in assets and liabilities, and therefore Demerjian (2011) finds a 
reduction in the use of balance-sheet covenants.  
4) The use and determinants of GAAP provisions. Different from covenant definition 
adjustments that are based on existing GAAP changes at contract initiation, GAAP provisions 
are used to specify the treatment of future GAAP changes. Note that although some covenants’ 
definitions are different from GAAP definitions due to covenant definition adjustments, GAAP 
changes have the ability to affect covenants when the changes are related to the accounting 




2.3 GAAP Provisions  
2.3.1 The Use and Determinants of GAAP Provisions 
Early studies focus on frozen and floating GAAP. Leftwich (1983) collects a sample of 
accounting measurement rules from Commentaries on Indentures and ten private loans issued 
before 1977, and finds that floating GAAP is more commonly used relative to frozen GAAP. 
He interprets the results as the dominance of the costs of keeping and monitoring multiple sets 
of accounting books under frozen GAAP over the costs of inadvertent covenant violations 
triggered by GAAP changes under floating GAAP. Collecting 83 debt contracts issued by 35 
oil and gas firms prior to 1977, Mohrman (1993) finds that 29 contracts use frozen GAAP. 
Mohrman (1996) uses a large sample of 228 debt contracts and finds that 90 contracts use 
frozen GAAP. He also finds that the frequency of frozen GAAP is positively associated with 
covenant intensity and increases over time, suggesting that borrowers and lenders are aware of 
the effect of GAAP changes on covenant calculations and start to solve the effect by using 
frozen GAAP. By surveying Fortune 500 companies as borrowers and the top 100 insurance 
firms and the top 400 banks as lenders, Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995) find that more than 
73 percent of borrowers agree to use floating GAAP. 
To overcome the concerns on small sample sizes and the limitation of the survey 
methodology in early literature, Christensen and Nikolaev (2017) construct a sample of 16,655 
private debt contracts initiated between 1994 and 2012. They document that the use of frozen 
GAAP increases significantly since 1994, that the main cross-sectional determinant of the use 
of frozen GAAP is borrowers’ uncertainty in future prospects, and that borrowers facing greater 
uncertainty are less likely to use frozen GAAP because they are more likely to suffer from the 
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lack of existing accounting treatment. In their internet appendix, they distinguish frozen-on-
request GAAP from frozen GAAP and find an increase in the use of frozen-on-request GAAP 
and a decrease in the use of frozen GAAP over time. They also provide some evidence on the 
determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP such as borrowers’ uncertainty, borrowers’ size and 
loan maturity, and find that those determinants explain the use of frozen GAAP and frozen-on-
request GAAP in similar ways. This dissertation contributes to this stream of literature by 
exploring the determinants that distinguish between frozen-on-request GAAP and frozen 
GAAP. In particular, I identify new determinants including the relative negotiation power of 
borrowers and lenders, borrowers’ financial reporting complexity, the number of lenders and 
the number of lenders squared, borrowers’ conservatism, the number of covenants, and the 
number of GAAP changes introduced by FASB just preceding the contract inception. 
2.3.2 The Effect of GAAP Provisions on Debt Contracting Efficiency 
Extant evidence on the impact of GAAP provisions on debt contracting efficiency is 
scarce. Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002) find that compared to frozen GAAP, floating GAAP 
has a higher loan spread, a proxy for debt contracting efficiency under agency theory. Although 
they do not conclude that frozen GAAP is more useful in improving debt contracting efficiency 
than floating GAAP, their results imply this conclusion. 
Another related study is by Darrough and Deng (2019) who construct a parsimonious 
model to examine the effect of frozen versus floating GAAP on borrowers’ investment 
decisions. They find that although floating GAAP would reduce the information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders because lenders may be informed about the state of borrowers’ 
projects, it would exacerbate the asset substitution problem. This is because GAAP changes 
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may reveal a bad project state and trigger covenant violations. In anticipation of these adverse 
consequences, borrowers would strategically choose more risky projects and distort ex ante 
investment decisions. As a result, floating GAAP reduces debt contracting efficiency. 
2.3.3 Discussion on the Effect of GAAP Provisions on Debt Contracting Efficiency 
GAAP provisions in debt contracts deal with the effect of accounting changes on 
covenant calculations and thereby affect the ability of covenants to capture borrowers’ state of 
nature. This, in turn, can affect control right allocations contingent on the state, namely 
covenant violations. Moreover, GAAP provisions could affect ex post contract renegotiations 
by specifying borrowers and lenders’ commitment to enter into renegotiations when GAAP 
changes affect covenant calculations. Therefore, the definition of debt contracting efficiency 
under incomplete contracting theory summarized in Gigler et al. (2009) is theoretically 
appealing in my setting.  
I use false positives (i.e., the Type I error of covenant violations) and false negatives 
(i.e., the Type II error of covenant violations) to quantify errors due to false alarms and errors 
due to missing early warnings in Gigler et al. (2009), respectively. False positives mean 
covenant violations occur when borrowers’ creditworthiness does not deteriorate, a scenario 
where control rights are transferred to lenders when they should not. False negatives mean 
covenant violations do not occur when borrowers’ creditworthiness deteriorates, a scenario 
where control rights should be transferred to lenders but are not.  
The opportunity costs arising from false positives are high because (1) borrowers need 
to communicate to lenders that the covenant violations do not indicate an increase in credit risk 
and the communication involves borrowers’ time and efforts; (2) borrowers may tailor their 
18 
 
investment (Darrough and Deng 2017), financing (Cohen, Katz, Mutlu, and Sadka 2019), and 
operating activities in anticipation of future false positives; and (3) inefficient control right 
transfer would be triggered and may result in the hold-up problem.8 False negatives are also 
costly because missing early warnings of creditworthiness deteriorations could lead to 
inefficient continuation decisions and thus transfer wealth from lenders to shareholders 
(Caskey and Hughes 2012). The reduced false positives and false negatives could minimize 
those opportunity costs arising from inefficient control right allocations, and therefore result in 
more efficient debt contracts.  
In this dissertation, I focus on false positives and false negatives rather than the loan 
spreads used in Beatty et al. (2002) mainly because loan spreads cannot directly capture the 
effect of GAAP provisions on debt contracting efficiency discussed above. By examining the 
effect on false positives and false negatives, my dissertation also contributes to the literature 
on the consequences of GAAP provisions. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter reviews research on debt contracting efficiency. To directly 
capture the effect of GAAP provisions on debt contracting efficiency, I adopt Gigler et al. 
(2009)’s definition that efficient debt contracts minimize the Type I error and Type II error of 
covenant violations. This chapter also reviews the literature on the role of accounting in 
improving debt contracting efficiency, especially GAAP provisions. Distinguished from prior 
studies that focus on frozen versus floating GAAP, this dissertation focuses on frozen-on-
 
8 Hold-up problem occurs when one party makes a sunk and non-contractible specific investment to prepare a 
future transaction and the other party can expropriate returns from the investment (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 
1978). For example, suppose that a lender provides a loan for the purpose of R&D to a borrower and an accounting 
change affects covenant calculation and causes false positives. When the borrower requests a waiver from the 
lender, the lender may hold up the borrower by requiring extra gains from the R&D project to exchange the waiver. 
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request GAAP, provides new evidence on its determinants, and investigates the effect of GAAP 
























This chapter develops hypotheses based on the themes reviewed in the previous chapter. 
I analyze how frozen-on-request GAAP is advantageous in two ways: 1) it is able to incorporate 
some and exclude other GAAP changes before renegotiations; and, 2) it can reduce 
renegotiation costs. Therefore, I argue that this type is more useful in reducing false positives 
and false negatives than frozen and floating GAAP. I elaborate on this development for 
hypothesis H1 in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents hypothesis H2 to test the first mechanism 
for reductions in false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP, i.e., its 
advantage in incorporating and excluding GAAP changes. Section 3.4 develops hypothesis H3 
to test the second mechanism, i.e., its advantage in reducing renegotiation costs and facilitating 
renegotiations. I conclude with a summary of the chapter in Section 3.5.  
3.2 Frozen-on-Request GAAP and Debt Contracting Efficiency 
As mentioned above, GAAP provisions have three types in practice. I examine whether 
frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in improving debt contracting efficiency than frozen 
and floating GAAP using the definition of debt contracting efficiency suggested by Gigler et 
al. (2009). Based on this definition, I use false positives and false negatives to measure debt 
contracting efficiency, and investigate whether frozen-on-request GAAP can lead to lower false 
positives and false negatives than frozen and floating GAAP.9 
A mission of the FASB is to “keep standards current to reflect changes in methods of 
 
9 Although I do not use the cost of debt capital as my measure of debt contracting efficiency, in the additional 
analyses (i.e., Chapter 6) I provide evidence on the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on the cost of debt capital. 
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doing business and changes in the economic environment” (FASB 2007).10 To achieve this 
mission, the FASB shifted its objective from reliability to relevance and issues substantial 
GAAP changes. As lenders demand relevant and reliable accounting information, GAAP 
changes are beneficial to debt contracting efficiency if they are informative of borrowers’ future 
cash flow payable to lenders (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2017) and reliable (e.g., Demerjian 2011). 
Donelson, Jennings, and Mcinnis (2017) find that around 89% of bank lenders hold a neutral-
to-positive view of the debt contracting efficiency of U.S. GAAP changes over the last 10 years. 
However, some GAAP changes reduce debt contracting efficiency because they are 
uninformative about future cash flows or unreliable. A specific example is SFAS 141 and 142, 
which replace the amortization of goodwill by the measurement of goodwill through 
impairment testing. The goodwill impairment is a nonrecurring item that may lack cash flow 
predictive ability (Beatty et al. 2019) and is also subject to borrower manipulations (Watts 2006; 
Beatty and Weber 2006), thus adding noise to covenant calculations (Frankel et al. 2008). To 
reduce false positives and false negatives, GAAP provisions should incorporate GAAP changes 
beneficial to debt contracting efficiency and exclude GAAP changes detrimental to debt 
contracting efficiency.  
I analyze the incorporation and exclusion of GAAP changes under the three types of 
GAAP provisions by starting with a simplified case without considering renegotiations (i.e., 
before renegotiations). (This simplified case and the following discussion are also summarized 
in tabular format in Figure 2.) I assume that borrowers care more about the effect of GAAP 
changes on covenant tightness11 because covenant violations are costly for borrowers. I also 
 
10 http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_fasb.pdf 
11 One may argue that GAAP changes have different influences on different types of financial covenants (i.e., 
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assume that lenders care more about the effect on debt contracting efficiency for two reasons.12 
First, if lenders also care more about the effect on covenant tightness, then all GAAP changes 
relevant to covenants would be rejected either by borrowers or by lenders, suggesting no 
difference between frozen-on-request GAAP and frozen GAAP. Second, lenders use covenants 
to monitor borrowers’ creditworthiness, and therefore it is crucial to use accounting information 
beneficial to debt contracting efficiency to calculate covenants to reflect borrowers’ true state. 
The assumption on lenders holds in most cases because both false negatives and false positives 
are costly to lenders. False negatives transfer wealth from lenders to borrowers because missing 
early warnings of creditworthiness deterioration could lead to inefficient continuation decisions. 
False positives trigger lenders to closely monitor borrowers and the cost of monitoring could 
dominate the benefits due to their asymmetric payoff function. Therefore, lenders have 
incentives to minimize false positives and false negatives and benefit from debt contracting 
efficiency. However, this assumption may not hold in the cases where the benefits of false 
positives exceed the costs, and I discuss these cases in detail in Section 6.2.1. 
Under the assumptions, lenders would reject GAAP changes detrimental to debt 
contracting efficiency and accept GAAP changes beneficial to debt contracting efficiency even 
if the changes loosen covenants. For example, the new GAAP on fair value of financial 
 
capital covenants versus performance covenants). To test the potential different influences, I need to compare the 
probabilities of false positives and false negatives between debt contracts containing only capital covenants and 
debt contracts containing only performance covenants. However, more than 90% of debt contracts in my false 
positives sample and false negatives sample contain performance covenants, suggesting that the number of debt 
contracts containing only capital covenants is small. Moreover, to capture the probabilities of false positives and 
false negatives, at least some contracts in my samples experience covenant violations. Under the two restrictions, 
the sample size of contracts containing only capital covenants and experiencing covenant violations is too small 
to allow me to test the potential different influences. 
12 This assumption is consistent with the findings in Dyreng et al. (2017) that the earnings measures used to 
calculate covenants are not conditionally conservative but are more predictive of borrowers’ future cash flow than 
GAAP earnings. Their findings suggest that lenders care more about the debt contracting efficiency of accounting 
information rather than the covenant tightness. 
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instruments and certain other items (SFAS 159) could loosen balance sheet covenants, but 85.5% 
private debt contracts will incorporate this GAAP change into covenant calculations especially 
when it is informative of borrowers’ hedging activities and liquidity value (Demerjian, 
Donovan, and Larson 2016). Another example is Revenue from Contracts with Customers 
(ASC 606). By adopting this GAAP change, telecommunication firms will allocate more of the 
transaction price to the equipment at the delivery because the revenue from selling the 
equipment will be measured using relative standalone selling prices rather than cash received, 
resulting in an early recognition of revenue. This GAAP change can loosen earnings covenants 
but better capture the changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness by reflecting the underlying 
economics of transactions. Therefore, lenders would accept this GAAP change. 
Borrowers would accept GAAP changes loosening covenants and reject GAAP changes 
tightening covenants even if the changes are beneficial to debt contracting efficiency. I take the 
standard on consolidation of variable interest entities (FASB Interpretation No. 46) as an 
example. This GAAP change requires the recognition of off-balance sheet liabilities, and 
therefore would better reflect borrowers’ underlying indebtedness but deteriorate borrowers’ 
maximum leverage covenants. As a response, borrowers can request a freeze.13 In this example, 
frozen-on-request GAAP cannot help reduce false negatives, implying that granting an option 
to reject GAAP changes under frozen-on-request GAAP is not always good for debt contracting 
efficiency. Although frozen-on-request GAAP is not perfect, it remains more useful in reducing 
false positives and false negatives than frozen and floating GAAP because frozen GAAP 
 
13 Accompanying the request, borrowers in most cases need to submit an explanation statement. As the statement 
may reveal borrowers’ disadvantageous information such as an accounting signal about a bad project state, 
borrowers may be reluctant to request such a freeze. 
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excludes all accounting changes and floating GAAP incorporates all GAAP changes before 
renegotiations.  
In practice, debt covenants are renegotiable.14 Renegotiation costs can be trivial in some 
non-syndicated private debt contracts. When this is the case, GAAP provisions are expected to 
be moot, i.e., there would be no difference in false negatives and false positives among the 
three types, because accounting changes could be renegotiated away at trivial costs. However, 
in general, renegotiation costs are non-trivial because syndicated loans have become more and 
more common and the amendment fees that borrowers need to pay can be up to 100 basis points 
of total credit commitment.15 Renegotiations can restore the ex-post efficiency of debt contracts 
when the ex-ante control right allocation designed at contract initiation becomes suboptimal ex 
post (Grossman and Hart 1986; Huberman and Kahn 1988). I compare the renegotiation costs 
under the three GAAP provision types in three scenarios as follows and summarize this 
discussion in Figure 3. 
First, suppose that both borrowers and lenders prefer the new GAAP. Under frozen-on-
request and floating GAAP, no renegotiation is needed, while under frozen GAAP the two 
parties need to enter into renegotiations to amend the existing contract. Second, suppose that 
both prefer the old GAAP. Under frozen-on-request GAAP, either party can request contract 
amendments to freeze GAAP changes until the request has been withdrawn or the contract is 
amended (i.e., renegotiation is not necessarily needed and therefore this type is termed as 
frozen-on-request GAAP without renegotiation) or the two parties enter into renegotiations 
 
14 Covenant renegotiations could occur without covenant violations (Denis and Wang 2014).  
15 Other expenses include attorneys’ fees, stamp and other taxes, search fees, filing fees, and other costs and 
expenses occurring during the execution and delivery of amendments. In addition to these observable costs, 
reputation concerns and relationship-maintenance concerns are also costly during the renegotiation process. The 
magnitude of these costs is higher than we assume (Skinner 2011). 
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upon the request to freeze (i.e., renegotiation is necessary and therefore this type is termed as 
frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation). However, no renegotiation is needed to amend 
contracts under frozen GAAP but renegotiations are required under floating GAAP. The 
renegotiation outcome in the two scenarios is to restore efficiency because GAAP changes 
beneficial (detrimental) to debt contracting usefulness will be incorporated into (excluded from) 
covenant calculations based on the above assumption. Therefore, I argue that compared to 
frozen and floating GAAP, frozen-on-request GAAP can save renegotiation costs and thereby 
restore the ex-post efficiency at a lower cost when borrowers and lenders have the same 
preference to GAAP changes. One concern is that the renegotiation costs in the two scenarios 
would be trivial because renegotiations increase the total surplus. However, in a syndicated 
loan, to make a nonmaterial amendment, it requires the approval of lenders holding a certain 
percentage of the loan amount (at least 50% based on Saavedra 2018’s statistics), and if the 
amendment is material, it requires the approval of all lenders (Standard & Poor’s 2011). 
Anecdotal and research evidence suggest that potential delays in obtaining lender agreement 
and hold-up by some participant lenders exist during the renegotiations of syndicated loans 
(e.g., Bris and Welch 2005; Saavedra 2018), resulting in non-trivial renegotiation costs. 
Third, suppose that the two parties have preference conflicts. Under frozen and floating 
GAAP, either party can reject renegotiations. In contrast, under frozen-on-request GAAP where 
renegotiations are necessary, if either party requests a freeze, the other party shall enter into 
renegotiations in good faith, implying the advantage of frozen-on-request GAAP in facilitating 
renegotiations. However, facilitating renegotiations does not necessarily restore ex-post 
efficiency because borrowers may abuse renegotiations to force lenders to agree to reject 
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GAAP changes beneficial to debt contracting efficiency but tightening covenants. I therefore 
posit that frozen-on-request GAAP may not restore the ex-post efficiency at a lower cost when 
borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences.  
From a theoretical point of view, frozen-on-request GAAP does not always improve 
debt contracting efficiency, although ex ante it tends to be efficiency-improving in more states. 
However, combining frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages in incorporating and excluding 
GAAP changes before renegotiations, and its reduced renegotiation costs when considering 
renegotiations, I expect that on average false positives and false negatives are lower under 
frozen-on-request GAAP.16  Therefore, I hypothesize that 
    H1a: False positives are lower for debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP provisions 
than for contracts with frozen and floating GAAP. 
 
    H1b: False negatives are lower for debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP provisions 
than for contracts with frozen and floating GAAP. 
I note that there are reasons to expect no change or even an increase in false positives 
and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP. First, as mentioned above, borrowers may 
abuse the option granted and the renegotiations under frozen-on-request GAAP to reject GAAP 
changes beneficial to debt contracting efficiency but tightening covenants. Second, for some 
GAAP changes with a long interval between the exposure draft date and the effective date, 
borrowers and lenders can specify how to treat these GAAP changes at contract initiation. For 
example, the new GAAP on leases was issued in May 2013 but did not go into effect until 
December 2018. Some of loan contracts initiated between the two dates already specified the 
 
16 I acknowledge that these directional predictions are motivated by my expectation that frozen-on-request GAAP, 
on average, improves debt contracting efficiency in the whole sample where shows the recent increase and current 
prevalence of frozen-on-request GAAP. In Section 6.2.2, I investigate one scenario where frozen-on-request 
GAAP is not more useful. 
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treatment of this GAAP change, indicating that there would be no difference in the effect of 
this accounting change on false positives and false negatives under the three types.17 Third, the 
literature on the value of contract commitment supports frozen GAAP because contracts should 
be rigid to reduce borrowers’ fears that the subsequent bargaining will deprive them of the non-
contractible effort/investment value when the non-contractible effort/investment value is 
necessary for their success (Rogerson 1992). Similarly, the asset substitution18 literature also 
supports frozen GAAP because in anticipation of disadvantageous information revelation and 
covenant violations caused by GAAP changes, borrowers may engage in more risky projects 
ex ante (Darrough and Deng 2017). Both streams of literature suggest that frozen GAAP leads 
to more efficient investments and therefore improves debt contracting efficiency. 
3.3 Mechanism 1 – Frozen-on-Request GAAP’s Advantage in Incorporating and 
Excluding GAAP Changes 
In the above hypothesis, I assume that borrowers will experience significant GAAP 
changes over the term of the debt contract. However, there is variation in standard setting 
activity. Accounting changes can significantly affect debt covenants if the changes are related 
to the recognition and measurement of accounting elements used in covenants, but may not 
significantly affect covenants if the changes are immaterial to firms, relate only to disclosures, 
are relevant for only one particular industry, or relate to accounting elements that are not used 
in covenants. Given this variation, I predict that the advantages of frozen-on-request GAAP in 
reducing false positives and false negatives are more pronounced for significant accounting 
 
17 An example is a term loan credit agreement between AT&T Inc. and JPMorgan Chase Bank on October 22, 
2016: “whether a lease constitutes a capital lease or an operating lease shall be determined based on GAAP as in 
effect on the date hereof, notwithstanding any modification or interpretative change thereto after the date hereof 
(including without giving effect to any treatment of leases under Accounting Standards Codification 842 or any 
other Accounting Standards Codification or Financial Accounting Standard having a similar result or effect)”. 
18 Asset substitution problem refers to borrowers’ behavior of replacing low-risk assets/projects by high-risk 
assets/projects and lenders’ behavior of forcing borrowers to take too little risk when lenders have too much power. 
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changes relevant to covenants. Accordingly, I state my second hypothesis as follows: 
    H2a: The reduction in false positives for debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP is 
more pronounced for significant accounting changes that are relevant to debt 
financial covenants. 
 
    H2b: The reduction in false negatives for debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP is 
more pronounced for significant accounting changes that are relevant to debt 
financial covenants. 
 
3.4 Mechanism 2 – Frozen-on-Request GAAP’s Advantage in Reducing Renegotiation 
Costs and Facilitating Renegotiations 
As mentioned above, frozen-on-request GAAP is further split into two types: frozen-
on-request GAAP without renegotiation and frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation. See 
Appendix I for examples. Using the variation in renegotiations within frozen-on-request GAAP, 
I analyze the role of frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantage in reducing renegotiation costs and 
facilitating renegotiations in reducing false positives and false negatives. To facilitate the 
analysis, I combine Figure 2 and Figure 3 and summarize the following discussion in Figure 4. 
Note that incorporating GAAP changes beneficial to efficiency but tightening 
covenants (Scenario 1) and excluding GAAP changes detrimental to efficiency but loosening 
covenants (Scenario 4) can reduce false negatives, and incorporating GAAP changes beneficial 
to efficiency but loosening covenants (Scenario 2) and excluding GAAP changes detrimental 
to efficiency but tightening covenants (Scenario 3) can reduce false positives. Scenarios 2 and 
3 are related to false positives and Scenarios 1 and 4 are related to false negatives. 
In Scenarios 2 and 3, borrowers and lenders have the same preference to GAAP changes. 
Under frozen-on-request GAAP without renegotiation, if both prefer new GAAP, then neither 
will send a request to reject the GAAP change and therefore no renegotiation is needed; and if 
both prefer old GAAP, then one party sends a request and the other party does not need to take 
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any action and therefore also no renegotiation is needed, implying that this type can save 
renegotiation costs. Under FOR with renegotiation, if both prefer new GAAP, neither will send 
a request; and if both prefer old GAAP, then the two parties need to enter into renegotiations. 
Under frozen GAAP, renegotiation is required to amend the contract to include the use of new 
GAAP when both prefer new GAAP but no renegotiation is required when both prefer old 
GAAP. In contrast, under floating GAAP, no renegotiation is needed when both prefer new 
GAAP but renegotiation is required to amend the contract to exclude the use of new GAAP 
when both prefer old GAAP. Therefore, I expect that the reduction in false positives will be 
more pronounced under frozen-on-request GAAP without renegotiation than under frozen-on-
request GAAP with renegotiation.  
In Scenarios 1 and 4, borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences towards 
GAAP changes and renegotiations will play an important role. Under frozen-on-request GAAP 
without renegotiation, frozen, and floating GAAP, either can reject renegotiation. However, the 
two parties shall enter into renegotiations under frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation, 
suggesting that this type can facilitate renegotiations. Therefore, I argue that the reduction in 
false negatives will be more pronounced under frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation 
than under frozen-on-request GAAP without renegotiation. 19 As a result, I state my third 
 
19 In my dissertation proposal, I develop an alternative hypothesis to consider the role of reduced renegotiation 
costs in improving debt contracting efficiency under frozen-on-request GAAP, by using the number of lenders 
(Num_Lender) to proxy for renegotiation costs. However, considering the correlation between Frozen-on-Request 
GAAP and Num_Lender, I delete the hypothesis and replace it with H3. Specifically, to test the alternative 
hypothesis, I need to add Num_Lender, Num_Lender_Sq and their interactions with Frozen-on-Request GAAP 
into the outcome model. Num_Lender has significant explanatory power of the use of frozen-on-request GAAP 
evidenced by the significant coefficient on Num_Lender in the choice model. As a result, the collinearity issue 
arises when adding both Num_Lender and Frozen-on-Request GAAP*Num_Lender into the outcome model. One 
may suggest that I could split my sample based on the median value of Num_Lender and then estimate the 
regression separately. This approach could help mitigate the collinearity concern, but the relation between the use 
of frozen-on-request GAAP and its advantages in reducing false positives and false negatives is concave. More 
specifically, when the number of lenders increases, frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful because it has 
advantages of facilitating renegotiations. But when the number of lenders increases to a certain level, 
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hypothesis as follows: 
    H3a: The reduction in false positives is more pronounced for debt contracts with frozen-on-
request GAAP without renegotiation. 
 
    H3b: The reduction in false negatives is more pronounced for debt contracts with frozen-
on-request GAAP with renegotiation. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I develop three hypotheses to be tested in the following chapter about 
research design. I present my first hypothesis on negative associations between frozen-on-
request GAAP and false positives and false negatives. I present the next two hypotheses to test 
two mechanisms through which the negative associations exist. 
 







In this chapter I describe the research design for the hypotheses developed in the 
previous chapter. The chapter starts by outlining my sample construction in Section 4.2 and 
follows with a discussion of the potential selection bias arising from the non-random choice of 
frozen-on-request GAAP in Section 4.3. To address the bias, I employ the Heckman (1979)’s 
selection model where I construct a choice model of frozen-on-request GAAP. Section 4.4 
describes the two measures of false positives and Section 4.5 describes the measure of false 
negatives. I conclude with a summary in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Sample Construction 
Table 1 outlines the sample selection process. Private debt contracts are disclosed in 
Exhibit 10 (i.e., material contract) of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. 20 I first 
collect all URLs of Exhibit 10s of SEC forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed between January 1994 
and December 2017 using SEC Analytics Suite and then download these Exhibit 10s from the 
EDGAR. I restrict Exhibit 10s to files containing the terms “credit agreement”, “loan 
agreement”, or “loan and security agreement”; the words “GAAP” or “Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles”; and the words “financial covenants” or “negative covenants”. 21 
Following Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), I drop extremely short files containing less than 
7,000 words. To reduce data contamination22 , I only retain the files that contain the terms 
 
20 Regulation S-K (1980) requires the mandatory disclosure of material contracts in the SEC filings as a form of 
Exhibit 10. 
21 I also consider their lowercase and uppercase formats as well as their singular and plural formats. 
22 Without this requirement, data contamination could come from (1) the whole 10-K or 10-Q shown as Exhibit 
10s without a private debt contract; (2) other types of material contracts that also satisfy the above requirements, 
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“credit agreement”, “loan agreement”, or “loan and security agreement” in the title (i.e., the 
first 3,072 characters of each Exhibit 10).23 
To locate GAAP provisions in debt contracts, I randomly check 300 subsamples and 
find that GAAP provisions generally are located in paragraphs defining terms such as “GAAP”, 
“Accounting Terms”, “Accounting Determinations”, “Accounting Matters”, and “Accounting 
Changes”. Then for each file in the search sample, I retain those paragraphs and manually 
delete irrelevant sentences to alleviate any concern that those sentences contain the keywords 
used to judge the type of GAAP provisions. Based on the description of GAAP provisions, I 
classify debt contracts into three categories: frozen-on-request GAAP, frozen GAAP, and 
floating GAAP (see examples in Appendix I). Specifically, I first manually code the 300 
subsamples and identify common keywords to help me automatically categorize the type of 
GAAP provisions. Second, I use these keywords to automatically code a pilot sample of 700 
debt contracts and revise keywords until I achieve an acceptably high degree of accuracy.24 
Third, I use the revised automated coding to classify the entire sample.  
The resulting sample contains 24,026 debt contracts. After merging it with Compustat 
via CIK identifier, I am left with 18,923 contracts (i.e., the initial sample).25 My sample size is 
larger than that in Christensen and Nikolaev (2017) and those in studies using DealScan sample 
 
such as omnibus agreements, guaranty, receivables sales agreements, and limited liability company membership 
purchase agreements; (3) duplicated contracts shown as commitment letters by lenders. 
23 I choose the first 3,072 characters to retain the first few lines rather than just the header, because in some special 
cases, without reading the description following the header, it is hard to judge the content of this file.  
 Although this procedure leads to a clean sample, it deletes debt contracts appearing in other parts except the 
beginning of Exhibit 10s. It is hard to extract those contracts from Exhibit 10 files. 
24 I manually code 1,000 debt contracts that include the previous 300 subsample and another pilot subsample of 
700, and revise my automated coding until more than 85% of contracts coded by my automated coding have the 
same classification results as those coded manually. To the extant that some contracts are misclassified, this will 
bias me against finding results supporting my hypotheses. 
25 Following Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), my sample includes both new and amended debt contracts. As 
amended contracts already reflect ex post renegotiations, the likelihood of false positives and false negatives 
would be lower under amended agreements. Including those agreements causes a conservative bias. 
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(e.g., Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). I delete loans with less than five-year maturity, mainly 
because these loans are less likely to experience GAAP changes relevant to covenants, 
weakening the role of GAAP provisions in debt contracts.26 To facilitate the data collection of 
debt contract characteristics, I manually match my initial sample to the facilities in DealScan 
and get a sample of 6,927 facilities outstanding to 2,144 public non-financial U.S firms. To 
ensure the accuracy of matching, I manually check whether the contracts’ borrower, issuing 
date, effective date, loan types (i.e., revolving loan or term loan), loan amount, loan maturity, 
and lenders (i.e., lead arranger, administrative agent, syndication agent, documentation agent, 
and other lender roles if exist) in my sample are the same as those in the DealScan.27  
I further require non-missing values of variables in the choice model of GAAP 
provision types. This requirement yields a final sample of 5,605 facilities for 1,716 borrowers. 
In this sample, 99 percent of borrower-initiation year observations have only one type of GAAP 
provision, and 84 percent of borrowers (i.e., 1,446 borrowers) have only one type of GAAP 
provision in my sample period, indicating that GAAP provision types are persistent over time 
at the firm level, consistent with Christensen and Nikolaev (2017).28 Among the remaining 16 
percent of borrowers (i.e., 274 borrowers), 184 borrowers change the type of GAAP provision 
from frozen or floating GAAP to frozen-on-request GAAP. 29 Of my final sample of 5,605 
facilities, 64 percent, 26 percent, and 10 percent have frozen-on-request GAAP, frozen GAAP, 
 
26 51.18 percent of facilities reported in DealScan have maturity more than five years (inclusive). 
27 Borrowers’ identifier is matched using the DealScan-Compustat linking table shared by Chava and Roberts 
(2008). 
28 Therefore, I don’t include firm fixed effects in Eq. (1). 
29 That means for a borrower, the maximum initiation date of debt contracts with frozen or floating GAAP (frozen-
on-request GAAP) is earlier than the minimum initiation date of debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP 
(frozen or floating GAAP). That means no time overlap. 




and floating GAAP, respectively. Among frozen GAAP, 62 percent have frozen GAAP with 
renegotiation and the rest have unconditionally frozen GAAP. 
4.3 Potential Self-Selection Issue – Determinant Model 
Frozen-on-request GAAP is not randomly chosen from the three alternative GAAP 
provision types. A non-random sample would result in a biased estimation of the effect of 
frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives and false negatives (i.e., average treatment effect 
on the treated). To correct for this potential self-selection bias, I employ Heckman’s (1979) 
selection model.30 First, I construct a determinant model of frozen-on-request GAAP based on 
borrowers’ and lenders’ relative negotiation power, the number of lenders and the number of 
lenders squared, borrowers’ financial reporting complexity, and other determinants. The 
determinants I investigate are beyond those reported in the internet appendix of Christensen 
and Nikolaev (2017), and therefore my dissertation contributes to the literature on the 
determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP. 
4.3.1 Relative Negotiation Power 
Frozen-on-request GAAP is the outcome of borrowers’ and lenders’ relative negotiation 
power. As frozen-on-request GAAP is used to satisfy lenders’ demands for accounting 
information, lenders prefer it to frozen and floating GAAP. This is supported by the frequency 
of frozen-on-request GAAP in contracts where Bank of America is the lead arranger. Bank of 
America is the top two largest lead arrangers in the private debt market (Ross 2010). In my 
 
30 Following Tucker (2010)’s suggestion, I use Heckman’s (1979) selection model rather than propensity-score 
matching, because the selection bias could be due to unobservable and uncontrolled determinants of frozen-on-
request GAAP. I also do not use the regular IV procedure, because based on Larcker and Rusticus (2010)’s survey, 
the endogenous variable in the IV method is a continuous variable but in the selection model it is an indicator 
variable. In my setting, the endogenous variable, frozen-on-request GAAP, is an indicator variable and therefore 
I use selection models. 
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regression sample of 5,605 facilities, 946 facilities have Bank of America as one of the lead 
arrangers. Of the 946 facilities, 701 have frozen-on-request GAAP provision, 174 have frozen 
GAAP provision, and the rest 71 have floating GAAP provision, indicating Bank of America’s 
preference towards frozen-on-request GAAP.  
However, in most cases, borrowers prefer floating GAAP because it is costly and 
difficult to keep multiple sets of accounting books in practice. Borrowers need to keep multiple 
sets if a GAAP change relevant to covenants occurs under frozen GAAP or if a GAAP change 
is rejected under frozen-on-request GAAP, but do not need to keep multiple sets under floating 
GAAP. Beatty et al. (2002) find that borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to avoid 
keeping multiple sets, suggesting borrowers’ preference to floating GAAP.  
Given the conflicting preferences of the two parties, the choice of frozen-on-request 
GAAP depends on their relative negotiation power. I use borrowers’ size (Firm Size) and credit 
risk proxied by Credit Rating and No Rating to measure borrowers’ negotiation power, and 
expect that borrowers with larger size and lower credit risk are less likely to use frozen-on-
request GAAP. I use Lender Reputation, an indicator variable equal to one if the lead arranger 
is one of the top ten lenders reported in Ross (2010), to capture lenders’ negotiation power, and 
expect a positive association between lenders’ reputation and the use of frozen-on-request 
GAAP. 
4.3.2 The Number of Lenders  
Frozen-on-request GAAP has advantages in reducing renegotiation costs. I measure 
renegotiation costs as the number of lenders (Num_Lender) because the coordination cost 
during the renegotiation process increases with the number of lenders (e.g., Bolton and 
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Scharfstein 1996). I predict a positive relationship between the number of lenders and the use 
of frozen-on-request GAAP. However, when the number of lenders increases beyond a cutoff 
(e.g., the loan is traded in the secondary loan market), renegotiations would become too costly 
to commit and therefore the two parties prefer no renegotiation under frozen and floating GAAP. 
Note that when the two parties have conflicting preferences towards GAAP changes, they 
should enter into renegotiations under frozen-on-request GAAP but can reject renegotiations 
under frozen and floating GAAP. I control for the square of the number of lenders, 
Num_Lender_Sq, and anticipate that facilities with a larger square of the number of lenders are 
less likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP. In sum, I expect a concave relationship between the 
number of lenders and the use of frozen-on-request GAAP. 
4.3.3 Financial Complexity 
As mentioned above, borrowers need to keep multiple sets of accounting books if a 
GAAP change is rejected under frozen-on-request GAAP. In practice, keeping multiple sets is 
costly and difficult especially for borrowers with complex financial reporting. Following You 
and Zhang (2009), I use the number of words in 10-Ks as a proxy for financial complexity 
(Financial Complexity) and expect that borrowers with complex financial reporting are less 
likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP. 
4.3.4 Other Determinants 
I control for borrowers’ Conservatism because Beatty et al. (2008) find that borrowers 
with lower reporting conservatism are more likely to have covenant definition adjustments. As 
both covenant definition adjustments and frozen-on-request GAAP serve to satisfy lenders’ 
demands for accounting information, I expect that borrowers with lower conservatism are also 
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more likely to have frozen-on-request GAAP. Similarly, I control for Collateral and expect that 
when lenders are protected by collateral, frozen-on-request GAAP is less likely to be used. 
Num_Covenant (i.e., the number of financial covenants) is added as a proxy for the level of 
reliance on accounting and lenders are more likely to require the use of frozen-on-request 
GAAP when the reliance on accounting is high. I also control for the type of facility (Revolver). 
Following Lennox et al. (2012)’s suggestion, I identify an exogenous independent variable, 
Num_GAAP_Change (i.e., the number of GAAP changes in the year prior to contract initiation), 
which is validly included in the determinant model and excluded from the outcome model (i.e., 
exclusion restriction). This variable should affect the use of frozen-on-request GAAP but 
should not affect false positives and false negatives during the term of the contract because 
those GAAP changes have already been taken into consideration at the contract inception.31 
 In addition to these new determinants, I control for existing determinants used in prior 
studies. Following Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), I add borrowers’ uncertainty in future 
prospects (Uncertainty), measured by R&D, Volatility, and Tobin’s Q, and expect that 
borrowers with higher uncertainty prefer floating GAAP to frozen-on-request GAAP, because 
these borrowers are more likely to suffer from the absence of existing GAAP treatment.32 
Following Beatty et al. (2002), I add Loan/Asset (i.e., the ratio of loan amount to borrowers’ 
total assets) and expect a positive relation between this ratio and the use of frozen-on-request 
GAAP because the protection provided via frozen-on-request GAAP becomes more important 
to both borrowers and lenders when the loan size relative to firm size is larger. To control for 
 
31 Findings reported in Table 4 suggest that firms are more likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP when the number 
of GAAP changes in the previous year is high. 
32  In contrast to Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), Darrough and Deng (2017) argue that firms with high 
uncertainty such as in high-technology or highly-competitive industries are more likely to use frozen GAAP. 
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the FASB’s objective shift from reliability to relevance, I include year fixed effects and expect 
that the shift can explain the increase in the use of frozen-on-request GAAP. See Appendix II 
for variable definitions. 
4.3.5 Determinant Model of Frozen-on-Request GAAP 
Considering the opposite signs of the determinants of floating and frozen GAAP, I 
conduct separate analyses for each pair-wise comparison, frozen-on-request GAAP versus 
frozen GAAP and frozen-on-request GAAP versus floating GAAP. One may argue that when 
the borrower and the lenders design GAAP provisions, there are three types available rather 
than just frozen-on-request GAAP versus frozen GAAP or frozen-on-request GAAP versus 
floating GAAP. To address this concern, I combine frozen and floating GAAP as non-frozen-
on-request GAAP and examine the determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP versus non-
frozen-on-request GAAP. 
    Frozen-on-Request GAAPj = β0 + β1Firm Sizeit-1 + β2Credit Ratingit-1 + β3No Ratingit-1  
                                                                      + β4Lender Reputationj + β5Num_Lenderj + β6Num_Lender_Sqj  
                                               + β7Financial Complexityit-1 + β8Conservatismit-1 + β9Collateralj   
                                               + β10Num_Covenantj + β11Revolverj + β12Uncertaintyit-1  
                                               + β13Loan/Assetj + β14Num_GAAP_ Changet-1 + Year FE + εj                                               
                                                                                                                                       (Eq. 1)
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In this probit regression, the subscript i refers to a borrower, j refers to a facility, and t 
denotes the facility initiation year. I use the final sample of 5,605 facilities for 1,716 borrowers 
to estimate this Equation. Based on the coefficient estimates, I construct the Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
33 In untabulated model, I also include borrowers’ relative risk aversion by using the data of Brenner (2015) and 
ROA, and find that the coefficients on both are insignificant. 
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by dividing the standard normal density by the cumulative standard normal distribution, and 
then include it as an additional explanatory variable in the outcome model where the dependent 
variable is a continuous variable. If the dependent variable in the outcome model is a binary 
variable, I conduct a maximum likelihood estimation where the selection model is Eq. (1).34 I 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to correct for outliers. 
4.4 Measures of False Positives  
False positives mean covenant violations occur when borrowers’ creditworthiness does 
not deteriorate. 35  Following Demerjian et al. (2020), I use two metrics to measure false 
positives. First, I identify false positives as the situation where borrowers have positive 
abnormal stock returns in one preceding quarter and the concurrent quarter but report debt 
covenant violations in the concurrent quarter (False Positives_1). Second, as stock returns 
capture more than the changes in credit risk, I identify false positives as an alternative situation 
where borrowers have credit rating upgrades in the year prior to debt covenant violations (False 
Positives_2). Admittedly, given that credit rating upgrades are not frequent, the sample of False 
Positives_2 is small, reducing the power of my test. The data of debt covenant violations 
between June 1996 and March 2008 is from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) who use a text-search 
algorithm to obtain actual covenant violations from the SEC filings.36 Following the procedure 
prescribed in Nini et al. (2012), I collect debt covenant violation data over the period of January 
 
34  Similar to the Heckman two-stage regression, the maximum-likelihood estimation (i.e., Heckprobit) also 
comprises a selection model and an outcome model, but there is no inverse mills ratio in the outcome model. 
35 One may argue that the covenant violation caused by accounting changes is a direct measure of false positives. 
However, it is difficult to identify this kind of covenant violation because in practice borrowers in most cases do 
not disclose the reasons for covenant violations. The exception is the violation of covenants restricting capital 
expenditure, a case where borrowers generally disclose the reasons. 
36 The Regulatory S-X requires disclosure following a debt covenant violation regardless of whether a waiver is 
granted or not. SEC (2003) required that “companies that are, or are reasonable likely to be, in breach of such 




2008 and December 2017.37 Specifically, I first use Python to search one of 20 terms (see 
Appendix III) in all 10-Ks or 10-Qs filed during this period, and retain the 10 lines before and 
after the term if the program finds a term. Then, I manually check these lines to ensure the 
existence of financial covenant violations in the reporting period of those filings.38 
To test H1a using False Positives_1, I collect a sample of facilities identified in Eq. (1) 
that have positive stock returns in one preceding quarter and the concurrent quarter during the 
term of contracts. I then merge the sample with debt covenant violation data, resulting in 23,153 
facility-year observations.39 After deleting borrowers having outstanding facilities with mixed 
GAAP provision types in a given year40, the sample size reduces to 21,026 observations. I 
further require non-missing values of independent variables, and I am left with 10,503 
observations, of which 163 experience debt covenant violations (i.e., False Positives_1 equals 
one).  
Similarly, to test H1a using False Positives_2, I construct a sample of facilities 
identified in Eq. (1) that experience an upgrade of the Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch 
ratings, and then merge with covenant violation data by requiring that the upgrade occurs in 
the preceding year of the violation, yielding 3,719 observations. I also require that borrowers 
have outstanding facilities with non-mixed GAAP provision types in a given year and have 
non-missing values of control variables. These requirements reduce my sample size to 1,700 
 
37 The period of overlap between Nini et al. (2012)’s debt covenant violation data and mine allows me to compare 
data and ensure the accuracy of my covenant violation data. 
38 For the 10-K filings, I check whether the covenant violations occur in the fourth quarter. In addition, if a 
borrower is during the “covenant holiday”, a period when the borrower is not required to comply with financial 
covenants, I code such cases as covenant compliance.  
39 Here the year is determined based on the concurrent quarter. 
40 This sample requirement is to increase the power of the test. Firms don’t disclose which facility they violate. 
That means the debt covenant violation data is at the firm level and therefore False_Positive is also at the firm 
level. If one firm has multiple type of GAAP provision in one year, then I can not identify which type of GAAP 
provision is in the violated facility. 
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observations. Of those observations, 52 experience debt covenant violations (i.e., False 
Positives_2 equals one).  
I use maximum likelihood estimation where the determinant model is Eq. (1) to test the 
effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives.  
False Positiveit = α0 + α1Frozen-on-Request GAAPjt + α2Firm Sizeit + α3Leverageit  
                           + α4ROAit + α5Dividendit + α6Std_Cash Flowsit + α7Ratingit + α8Covenant 
                            Tightnessjt + α9Collateraljt + εit                                                    (Eq. 2)                      
Where I control for factors that have been shown to affect false positives in Demerjian et al. 
(2020). These factors include Firm Size, Leverage, ROA, an indicator variable equal to one if 
a borrower pays dividends (Dividend), the standard deviation of annual operating cash flows 
in previous five years (Std_Cash Flows), Rating, Covenant Tightness, and Collateral. H1a 
predicts a negative coefficient on Frozen-on-Request GAAP. As the Heckman specification 
could underestimate the likelihood of rare events, I also employ the Penalized Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (Firth 1993).   
4.5 Measure of False Negatives 
False negatives mean covenant violations do not occur when borrowers’ 
creditworthiness deteriorates.41 My measure of false negatives is the instantaneous risk of a 
covenant violation (Num_Month) proposed by Zhang (2008). More specifically, if covenant 
violations occur, Num_Month equals the number of months between the first negative stock 
 
41 I don’t use credit rating downgrades as creditworthiness deterioration because prior studies such as Cheng and 
Neamtiu (2009) find that credit rating downgrades lack timeliness. Lack of timeliness would reduce the number 
of months between credit rating downgrade and the first covenant violation following the downgrade, and 
therefore significantly hinders the ability of the number of months to capture false negatives. Credit rating 
upgrades also occur with a lag, but for my measure of false positives the timeliness issue is not as crucial as for 
the measure of false negatives because I use a broad window to measure false positives, and therefore I still use 
credit rating upgrade sample to estimate the probability of false positives. 
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price shock defined as less than −28% monthly abnormal return and the first covenant violation 
following the price shock. If no covenant violation occurs, Num_Month is the number of 
months between the first negative stock price shock and the sample ending or loan maturity 
(see Figure 5). Considering the effect of financial crisis on stock returns, I adjust borrowers’ 
monthly return by the value-weighted market return. The choice of −28% as the cutoff is to 
identify negative stock price shocks that are two standard deviations lower than the mean. A 
smaller Num_Month implies that covenant violations occur in a timely manner and therefore 
false negatives are lower.  
To test my hypothesis H1b, I collect a sample of facilities during the 1996 and 2017 
period identified in Eq. (1), which experience at least one negative stock price shock between 
facility initiation dates and the sample ending date (or maturity dates). I identify the first 
negative stock price shock for each facility and then merge with covenant violation data to 
calculate Num_Month. I also require non-missing values of control variables. The above 
requirements yield a regression sample of 1,322 facilities from 552 borrowers. Of the 1,322 
facilities, 387 report covenant violations subsequent to the first negative stock price shock. 
Using this sample, I estimate the following model: 
 Log(Num_Monthj) = α1Frozen-on-Request GAAPj + α2Cumretj + α3Firm Sizei + α4Leveragei 
                                   + α5ROAi + α6Ratingi + α7Loan Sizej + α8Month_to_ Maturityj 
                                   + α9Num_Covenantj + α10Inverse Mills Ratioj + Year FE + εj      (Eq. 3)            
where I control for cumulative negative stock returns (Cumret), Firm Size, Leverage, ROA, 
Rating, Loan Size, the number of months between the first negative stock price shock and loan 
maturity (Month_to_Maturity), and Num_Covenant. I include the Inverse Mills Ratio derived 
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from Eq. (1) to correct for potential self-selection bias. H1b predicts a negative coefficient 
(α1<0) for frozen-on-request GAAP (i.e., frozen-on-request GAAP decreases with the number 
of months).  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews my sample construction, the use of Heckman (1979)’s selection 
model to address the potential self-selection issue, and the measures of false positives and false 
negatives. As the existing evidence on the determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP is scarce, 
one contribution of my dissertation is the introduction of its determinant model. Equations (2) 











EMPIRICAL ANALYSES – THE EFFECT OF FROZEN-ON-REQUEST 
GAAP ON FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test my three hypotheses on the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on 
false positives and false negatives. The chapter begins with the descriptive statistics relevant 
to my Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 reports the results of the 
determinant model of frozen-on-request GAAP. Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 provide the results 
of the three hypotheses separately. I conclude this chapter in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution by filing years of my initial sample (i.e., 18, 
923 debt contracts in Column 1) and regression sample (i.e., 5,605 facilities in Column 2). In 
Column 1, the number of debt contracts filed before 2001 is smaller than the sample used in 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), because many debt contracts filed before 2001 are embedded 
in the SEC filings rather than as a separate Exhibit 10. The number of observations shrinks in 
2017 because the update on the historical GVKEY-CIK Linking Table from WRDS SEC 
Analytics Suite lacks timeliness.42 Figure 1 shows the trend in the three types of GAAP 
provisions. Frozen-on-request GAAP has become more popular mainly because it can better 
deal with the changes in accounting standards and loan syndications. In particular, frozen-on-
request GAAP can better deal with the more frequent GAAP changes and the FASB’s objective 
shift from reliability to relevance by incorporating (excluding) GAAP changes beneficial 
 
42 I downloaded the table on August 9th, 2018 when some borrowers’ last date of Compustat Data hadn’t been 
updated to 2017. 
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(detrimental) to debt contracting efficiency. The common use of syndicated loans lead to 
nontrivial renegotiation costs and frozen-on-request GAAP can reduce renegotiation costs and 
facilitate renegotiations. 
Panels A, B, C and D of Table 3 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in Eq. (1), (2) and (3). Specially, the descriptive statistics reported in Panel B and C for Eq. (2) 
are comparable to those of Demerjian et al. (2020). Also, the statistics reported in Panel D for 
Eq. (3) are comparable to the statistics of the negative stock price shock sample reported in 
Zhang (2008). 
5.3 Results for the Determinant Model 
Table 4 presents the results of the determinant model. To compare with prior studies, I 
first combine frozen-on-request GAAP with frozen GAAP in Column 1 to contrast frozen 
GAAP broadly defined with floating GAAP. In this column, two of the three uncertainty 
measures, R&D and Volatility, are negatively associated with the probability of broad frozen 
GAAP, consistent with Christensen and Nikolaev (2017). Although the significantly positive 
coefficient on Tobin’s Q is not consistent with Christensen and Nikolaev (2017), it is consistent 
with the notion that firms in the growth stage tend to have a higher demand for debt capital and 
therefore have weaker negotiation power over the choice of GAAP provision types. As lenders 
prefer frozen-on-request GAAP, borrowers with higher Tobin’s Q are more likely to have 
frozen-on-request GAAP.  
The next three columns of Table 4 report the results for the determinants of frozen-on-
request GAAP. Specifically, columns 2 and 3 show the results of pair-wise comparisons, 
frozen-on-request GAAP versus floating GAAP and frozen-on-request GAAP versus frozen 
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GAAP. The significantly negative coefficient on Firm Size and significantly positive 
coefficients on Credit Rating and No Rating in Column 2 indicate borrowers’ preference for 
floating GAAP. This is consistent with the survey result of Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995) 
that 73 percent of borrowers agree to use floating GAAP rather than frozen GAAP. The results 
in Column 3 can help distinguish frozen-on-request GAAP from frozen GAAP. Specifically, 
lenders with higher negotiation power (Lender Reputation), contracts with a larger number of 
lenders (Num_Lender), and borrowers facing higher uncertainty (Tobin’s Q and R&D) are more 
likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP. However, contracts with collateral protection 
(Collateral) and borrowers with conservative financial reporting (Conservatism) are more 
likely to use frozen GAAP. Those results explain the different trends in the use of frozen-on-
request GAAP and frozen GAAP, extending the determinants reported in Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2017). 
Column 4 reports the results of the determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP versus 
non-frozen-on-request GAAP. The coefficient on Lender Reputation is significantly positive, 
indicating that lenders prefer frozen-on-request GAAP to frozen and floating GAAP.43 The 
significantly positive coefficient on Num_Lender echoes the upward trend in syndicated loans 
and is consistent with frozen-on-request GAAP being preferable as renegotiation costs increase. 
However, Num_Lender_Sq is negatively associated with Frozen-on-Request GAAP, suggesting 
that when the number of lenders increases beyond a certain cutoff, the high renegotiation costs 
would hinder borrowers and lenders’ willingness to renegotiate and as a result the two parties 
would prefer no renegotiation under frozen or floating GAAP. The significantly negative 
 
43 The result is similar by coding Lender Reputation as an indicator variable equal to one if the lead arranger is 
one of the top three lenders reported in Ross (2010). 
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relationship between Financial Complexity and Frozen-on-Request GAAP is in line with my 
expectation that borrowers with complex financial reporting would bear higher costs of keeping 
multiple sets of accounting books and therefore are less likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP. 
In addition, when lenders are protected by borrowers’ conservative financial reporting and 
collateral, they reduce their reliance on frozen-on-request GAAP evidenced as significantly 
negative coefficients on Conservatism and Collateral. These results help explain why some 
private debt contracts use frozen-on-request GAAP but others do not, above and beyond the 
determinants of GAAP provision types explored in prior studies.  
5.4 Results for Hypothesis H1 
Table 5 presents the results of the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives 
using the positive stock return sample (i.e., my first measure of false positives). I employ three 
methods to estimate the effect, the maximum likelihood estimation to control for potential self-
selection bias (i.e., Heckman), the Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation method to 
correct for the likelihood of rare events (i.e., Firthlogit), and the ordinary probit regression as 
a robustness test of Heckman regression following the suggestion from Lennox et al. (2012).44 
The benchmark in columns 1, 2, and 3 is floating GAAP, while in columns 4, 5, and 6 is frozen 
GAAP and in columns 7 to 9 is non-frozen-on-request GAAP. The significantly negative 
coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP across the nine columns reflect that false positives 
are lower under frozen-on-request GAAP than under frozen and floating GAAP. Moreover, the 
Heckman results are economically meaningful in that contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP 
are 20.0% (Column 1), 21.4% (Column 4) and 25.4% (Column 7) less likely to experience false 
 
44 Among the three methods, the maximum likelihood estimation is the best in this setting because it corrects for 
the potential self-selection issue which could bias my results. 
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positives than contracts with floating GAAP, frozen GAAP, and non-frozen-on-request GAAP, 
respectively.45 Also, the significant and negative coefficients on Firm Size, ROA and Dividend 
and the significantly positive coefficients on Collateral and Covenant Tightness suggest that 
larger, more profitable, and dividend paying borrowers and debt contracts with less tight 
covenants and no collateral are less likely to experience false positives. 
Table 6 reports the results of the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives 
using the credit rating upgrade sample (i.e., my second measure of false positives). As shown 
in columns 1 to 9, false positives are significantly lower under frozen-on-request GAAP than 
under floating GAAP, frozen GAAP, and non-frozen-on-request GAAP. With respect to the 
economic significance of the Heckman results, I find that contracts with frozen-on-request 
GAAP are 18.3% (Column 1), 29.7% (Column 4), and 24.6% (Column 7) less likely to 
experience false positives relative to contracts with floating GAAP, frozen GAAP, and non-
frozen-on-request GAAP, respectively. The significant and negative coefficients on Firm Size 
and Dividend are consistent with the results in Demerjian et al. (2020), and the significantly 
positive coefficients on Covenant Tightness imply that borrowers with tighter covenants are 
more likely to experience false positives. Taken together, the results reported in tables 5 and 6 
support H1a that on average false positives are lower under frozen-on-request GAAP than 
under frozen and floating GAAP.  
I next highlight the regression results of the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false 
negatives in Table 7. In columns 1 to 6, I take the log of Num_Month as the dependent variable 
and use both the Heckman two-stage regression and OLS regression because OLS is more 
 
45 I use the marginal effect to evaluate the economic significance. 
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robust than the Heckman two-stage regression (Lennox et al. 2012).46 I find that the coefficients 
on Frozen-on-Request GAAP are significantly negative in Column 1 (−0.252, p=0.002), 
Column 3 (−0.149, p=0.013), and Column 5 (−0.152, p=0.005), indicating lower false 
negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP. Specifically, the coefficients suggest that the number 
of months in contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP decreases by 25.2%, 14.9%, and 15.2% 
relative to in contracts with floating GAAP, frozen GAAP, and non-frozen-on-request GAAP, 
respectively. In addition, the negative coefficients on Cumret, Leverage and Month-to-Maturity, 
and the positive coefficients on Firm Size, ROA and Rating are consistent with Zhang (2008). 
The significant coefficient on Inverse Mills Ratio in Column 5 suggests that the correction for 
selection bias is significant in the model.  
In columns 7 to 9, I replace Log(Num_Month) by Num_Month, a count variable, as the 
dependent variable and employ the Poisson regression. The coefficients on Frozen-on-Request 
GAAP remain significantly negative. In sum, the results in Table 7 supports my H1b that on 
average false negatives are lower for debt contracts with frozen-on-request GAAP than for 
contracts with frozen and floating GAAP.47 
 
 
46 Lennox et al. (2012) find that OLS is more robust than Heckman selection model because it does not have 
exclusion restrictions and has low multicollinearity.  
47 One concern is the trade-off between false positives and false negatives. In my study, I find reductions in both 
false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP, mitigating this concern.  
    Some studies use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to gauge the performance of classification 
models and to more formally consider the trade-off between false positives and false negatives (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000; Kim and Skinner 2012; Bao, Ke, Li, Yu, and Zhang 2020). The dependent variable in the model 
is a binary classification problem (e.g., covenant violation versus no violation). This curve plots the true positive 
rate (i.e., Sensitivity) against the false positive rate (i.e., 1- Specificity). Sensitivity=True Positive/(True Positive + 
False Negative), and Specificity=True Negative/(True Negative + False Positive). The area under the ROC curve 
captures the ability of the model to classify or discriminate. The larger the area, the higher the ability to classify. 
I do not use this method for two reasons. First, technically this method requires a logit or probit specification, but 
my main specification is Heckman selection model. Second, this method works well to compare different 
classification models, but I have only one classification model.  
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5.5 Results for Hypothesis H2 
To test the effect of variation in standard setting activity, I review all major standards 
over my sample period and select fifteen SFAS as the most relevant standards to financial 
covenants (see Table 8) based on the following criteria. First, SFAS should not be about 
changes to disclosures only, such as SFAS 131 and 132, or for financial industries such as SFAS 
134 and 138. Second, SFAS should materially affect the definitions of financial covenants.48 
For example, I exclude SFAS 128 (Earnings per Share) because performance covenants are not 
based on EPS. Third, it must be feasible to identify affected firms. For example, I exclude SFAS 
133 and 137 (Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities) as I am unable to 
identify nonfinancial firms with derivative instruments around the effective date of June 15, 
2000. I use SFAS rather than FASB updates for two reasons. First, an update may not have the 
power to significantly affect financial covenants. Second, the high frequency of updates 
issuance evidenced by the 16.7 accounting updates per year on average from 2009 to 2018 
increases the difficulty to get rid of potential confounding events. 
For each of the fifteen SFAS, I identify the effective date and establish criteria to select 
affected firms. The criteria to select affected firms follow Khan, Li, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam (2018), except the criteria for SFAS 157 and 159 because the banking industry 
which is the base of affected firms in their study is excluded in my paper. To test the effect of 
the fifteen SFAS on false positives and false negatives, I regard the three years prior to each 
effective date as the pre-treatment period and the three years subsequent to each effective date 
 
48 I include SFAS 123 (Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation) that introduces a fair value-based method of 
accounting for stock-based compensation but allows the continued use of intrinsic value-based method if firms 
make pro forma disclosures of net income. In the untabulated analysis, I find similar results to those of Table 9 if 
I exclude SFAS 123. 
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as the post-treatment period.49 The time restriction is to mitigate the concern on confounding 
events. I compare false positives and false negatives in the pre- versus post-treatment periods 
and I expect lower false positives and false negatives in the post-treatment period. 
Table 9 presents the results of the effect of the fifteen SFAS. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 is False Positives_1, in columns 3 and 4 is False Positives_2, and in columns 
5 and 6 is Log(Num_Month). Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP 
on false positives and false negatives in the pre-treatment period and columns 2, 4 and 6 report 
the effect in the post-treatment period. I use the Heckman specification and find that the 
coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP are not significant in two of the three tests in the pre-
treatment period but highly significant for all three in the post-treatment period.50 Collectively, 
Table 9 provides systematic evidence for H2a and H2b that the reductions in false positives 
and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP are more pronounced during periods of 
significant accounting changes relevant to financial covenants.  
5.6 Results for Hypothesis H3 
To explore frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages in reducing renegotiation costs and 
facilitating renegotiations, I split the frozen-on-request GAAP contracts into GAAP with 
renegotiation and GAAP without renegotiation, and examine the effect of GAAP provision 
 
49 For Num_Month, I require that the first negative shock (i.e., the start point of the time interval) should occur in 
the three years subsequent to the effective date in the post-period, but I do not impose an equivalent restriction in 
the pre-period. This is because the effective dates of the 15 SFAS spanned from 1995 to 2008 and I focus on debt 
contracts with more than five-year maturity. As a result, if I require that the first covenant violation or the maturity 
(i.e., the end point of the time interval) should occur in the three years prior to the effective date in the pre-period, 
my sample size in the pre-period would be only 195. The result using the 195 observations (untabulated) is 
quantitatively similar to the result without imposing such restriction in the pre-period. 
50 If a firm-year is in both the pre- and post-period samples, then this would weaken the power of my tests. 
Therefore, I use a sample of unique firm-year-post observations (i.e., for a firm-year, if the count of Post equal to 
one is larger than the count of Post equal to zero, then I delete the observations in the pre-period and otherwise 
delete the observations in the post-period to keep my sample size as large as possible) and get similar results. 
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type on false positives and false negatives. For this analysis, I use a sample of frozen-on-request 
GAAP with renegotiation versus non-frozen-on-request GAAP and a sample of frozen-on-
request GAAP without renegotiation versus non-frozen-on-request GAAP. Table 10 presents 
the results. The coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP are significantly negative in columns 
2 and 4 where I compare frozen-on-request GAAP without renegotiation to non-frozen-on-
request GAAP. However, the coefficients are not significant in Column 1 or in Column 3 where 
I compare frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation to non-frozen-on-request GAAP. The 
results suggest that compared to frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation, frozen-on-
request GAAP without renegotiation is more useful in reducing false positives, supporting 
frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantage in reducing renegotiation costs. For the results of false 
negatives, the coefficient on Frozen-on-Request GAAP is significantly negative in Column 5 
where I compare frozen-on-request GAAP with renegotiation to non-frozen-on-request GAAP 
but not significant in Column 6. The results indicate that frozen-on-request GAAP with 
renegotiation is more useful in reducing false negatives and support frozen-on-request GAAP’s 
advantage in facilitating renegotiations. Taken together, the results in Table 10 provide strong 
evidence on the second mechanism and support H3. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In summary, results reported in this chapter suggest that compared to frozen and 
floating GAAP, frozen-on-request GAAP can better address the impact of GAAP changes on 
covenant calculations evidenced by lower false positives and false negatives. The lower false 
positives and false negatives can be attributable to frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages in 






In this chapter, I conduct additional analyses on the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP. 
The chapter begins with efforts to explore when frozen-on-request GAAP becomes less useful 
in reducing false positives and false negatives. In particular, I consider the effects of financial 
crisis and the preference conflicts between borrowers and lenders in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
examines the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on debt contracting efficiency based on agency 
theory where I measure debt contracting efficiency as loan spreads. To mitigate concerns on 
existing measures of false positives, I construct a new measure of false positives by using bond 
returns as a proxy for borrowers’ creditworthiness in Section 6.4. I use an alternative cutoff to 
identify the negative stock price shock and re-estimate the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP 
on false negatives in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 uses two ways to mitigate the concern on 
multicollinearity in the Heckman selection model and Section 6.7 investigates the determinants 
of frozen-on-request GAAP using a switching sample. Section 6.8 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 When Is Frozen-on-Request GAAP Less Useful? 
6.2.1 The Effect of Financial Crisis on False Positives 
In hypotheses H1a and H1b, I assume that lenders care more about debt contracting 
efficiency of GAAP changes and borrowers care more about the effect of GAAP changes on 
covenant tightness. The assumption relating to lenders may not hold during the financial crisis 
when the banking industry’s regulatory capital increases. Anecdotal evidence shows that to 
increase capital, banks will care more about covenant tightness and push borrowers into 
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covenant violations to trigger renegotiations to obtain favorable contract terms such as higher 
interest rates and shorter maturity.51 That suggests the reduction in false positives under frozen-
on-request GAAP may become weaker or even disappear during the financial crisis. 
To test this expectation, I employ the Heckman specification and estimate Eq. (2) during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis and in the remaining sample period, separately. As credit rating 
upgrades during the financial crisis are rare, I only use the positive stock return sample (i.e., 
the first measure of false positives). Table 11 presents the results. The coefficients on Frozen-
on-Request GAAP are negative but insignificant over 2007-2008 and are significantly negative 
in other years, consistent with my expectation. 
6.2.2 Conflicting Preferences towards GAAP Changes – SFAS 159 
My directional predictions in H1 are motivated by my expectation that frozen-on-
request GAAP, on average, is more useful in improving debt contracting efficiency in more 
states in the whole sample. In this Section, I examine a scenario where frozen-on-request 
GAAP is not more useful. As discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.2, when borrowers and lenders 
have conflicting preferences, under frozen-on-request GAAP borrowers may reject GAAP 
changes beneficial to contracting efficiency but tightening covenants before renegotiations and 
abuse renegotiations to push lenders to agree to reject these GAAP changes. As a result, frozen-
on-request GAAP may not be more useful. To provide empirical evidence on this expectation, 
I use SFAS 159 as the research event given the debate around the standard’s usefulness. 
Demerjian et al. (2016) find that this GAAP change is more likely to be incorporated into 





value and is less likely to be incorporated when borrowers have unreliable fair value measure.  
Following Demerjian et al. (2016), I construct a measure to capture where fair values 
are less likely to be reliable. Unreliable fair value measure (Unreliable FV) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the borrower’s ratio of Level 2 and 3 assets and liabilities to total 
financial assets and liabilities reported in the first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 
2007 is higher than the median value. I assume that when borrowers have less reliable fair 
values (i.e., Unreliable FV = 1), they prefer to adopt SFAS 159 but lenders prefer not to; but 
when borrowers have reliable fair values (i.e., Unreliable FV = 0), both prefer the adoption. I 
use a sample of firms reporting any financial assets and liabilities in the first fiscal year after 
the adoption of SFAS 159, and expect reductions in false positives and false negatives in the 
three years after the adoption under frozen-on-request GAAP when borrowers have reliable 
fair value measure.  
Table 12 reports the results of the effect of borrowers’ and lenders’ conflicting 
preferences towards GAAP changes in the setting of SFAS 159. The significantly negative 
coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP in columns 2 and 4 where borrowers have more 
reliable fair value and the insignificant coefficients in columns 1 and 3 where borrowers have 
less reliable fair value support my expectation that frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in 
reducing false positives when borrowers and lenders have the same preference. For the results 
of false negatives, the coefficient in Column 6 is negative but insignificant and in Column 5 is 
insignificantly positive. The insignificant results may be caused by the small number of 




6.3 The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on Cost of Debt Capital 
Agency theory (e.g., Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris 2002; Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008) suggests that reduced agency and information problems improve debt 
contracting efficiency, measured by cost of debt capital in empirical studies. In contrast to these 
studies, I formulate my hypotheses based on incomplete contracting theory and measure 
efficiency as the minimum of false positives and false negatives. My rationale for this decision 
is three-fold. First, the mechanism through which frozen-on-request GAAP is more efficient in 
addressing the impact of evolving GAAP on debt covenants is to reduce false positives and 
false negatives. Second, covenants may become ex post inefficient when accounting changes 
affect covenant calculations and false positives and false negatives can capture the ex-post 
inefficiency. However, cost of debt capital is an ex-ante measure of efficiency and therefore 
fails to capture the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on covenants’ ex-post efficiency. Third, 
“regardless of efficiency issues, debt holders would always be willing to accept a lower interest 
rate in return for more frequent transfer of decision rights to them” (Gigler et al. 2009, page 
770), indicating that the low cost of capital may not be a result of efficiency.  
However, considering the common use of cost of debt capital as a measure of debt 
contracting efficiency in empirical studies, I also estimate the effect of frozen-on-request 
GAAP on loan spreads for the comparability with previous studies. Beatty et al. (2002) use a 
sample of 84 private debt contracts issued between 1994 and 1996 to document that loan 
spreads are lower under frozen GAAP than under floating GAAP, highlighting the cost 
associated with accounting flexibility over the adoption of accounting changes under floating 
GAAP. In the same vein, I argue that loan spreads under frozen-on-request GAAP are also 
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lower than under floating GAAP, consistent with the finding in the early version of Christensen 
and Nikolaev (2017) that frozen-on-request GAAP has lower credit spreads and fees relative 
to floating GAAP based on a sample of 500 private debt contracts. Although Beatty et al. 
(2002)’s results also suggest lower loan spreads under frozen GAAP, I expect that the spreads 
under frozen-on-request GAAP could be even lower than the spreads under frozen GAAP. This 
is because frozen-on-request GAAP can better satisfy lenders’ demands for accounting 
information than frozen GAAP and therefore lenders are more willing to accept low spreads. I 
use a sample of 5,605 facilities and construct Eq. (4) by augmenting the model used in Ahmed 
et al. (2002) and Wittenberg-Moerman (2008). 
Spreadj = α0 + α1Frozen-on-Request GAAPj + α2Leveragei + α3ROAi+ α4Ratingi  
                + α5Loan/Assetj + α6Maturityj + α7Revolverj + α8Num_Covenantj 
                + α9Inverse Mills Ratioj + Loan Purpose FE + Year FE + εj                   (Eq. 4) 
Table 2 Panel E presents the descriptive statistics of the regression variables. Table 13 
reports the results of the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on loan spreads using the Heckman 
regression and the OLS regression. I find significantly lower spreads under frozen-on-request 
GAAP compared to non-frozen-on-request GAAP. I also find that relative to frozen GAAP, 
frozen-on-request GAAP has much lower spreads. However, the reduction becomes weak when 
I compare spreads of frozen-on-request GAAP with spreads of floating GAAP. The weak 
evidence could be explained by borrowers’ strong negotiation power under floating GAAP. 
Collectively, the results in Table 13 indicate that frozen-on-request GAAP enhances debt 
contracting efficiency as evidenced by lower loan spreads. Although I use a different definition 
and different measures of debt contracting efficiency, this table provides additional supports 
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for my primary findings.  
6.4 Alternative Measure of False Positives 
Shareholders have incentives to enrich themselves as the expense of debtholders and as 
a response, debtholders seek to protect themselves via covenants.52 Under the shareholder-
debtholder conflict, the positive abnormal stock return combined with a covenant violation may 
be a true covenant violation rather than a false positive.53 Using credit rating upgrades to reflect 
changes in credit risk is also problematic because credit ratings lack timeliness (Cheng and 
Neamtiu 2009). To mitigate these concerns, I construct a new measure by using bond returns 
to capture borrowers’ creditworthiness and identifying false positives as borrowers who have 
positive bond returns in two consecutive quarters but report covenant violations in the 
concurrent quarter (i.e., False Positives_3). Bond returns pertain to debt and capture the 
changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness in a timely manner. By proposing this new measure of 
false positives, my dissertation also extends Demerjian et al. (2020). 
For False Positives_3, I collect bond trading data from the TRACE database, follow 
the procedure in Dick-Nielsen (2009) to clean the data, and exclude canceled, corrected, and 
reverse trades. To calculate quarterly bond returns, I first compute the quarter-end bond price 
as the trade-volume weighted average of prices in the last trading day of the quarter. Using this 
quarter-end price and the method in Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2013), I estimate 
quarterly bond returns as the ratio of the difference between the sum of quarter-end price, 
accrued interest and coupon paid during the quarter and the sum of lagged quarter-end price 
 
52 Cascino (2017) find that stock-bond return co-movement is stronger when there are covenants in debt contracts. 
53 The concern of shareholder-bondholder conflict is mitigated for false negatives because the simultaneous 
occurrence of increasing bond returns and decreasing stock returns is mainly caused by macroeconomic factors 
such economic slowdowns. 
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and lagged accrued interest to the sum of lagged quarter-end price and lagged accrued interest. 
For a borrower with more than one outstanding bonds in the quarter, I treat the borrower as a 
portfolio and calculate the value-weighted average of bond returns, following the suggestion 
of Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). Using the bond returns data, I first validate 
bond returns as a proxy for borrowers’ creditworthiness by demonstrating the relation between 
bond returns and credit rating downgrades. In particular, I sort the sum of bond returns in one 
preceding quarter and the concurrent quarter by decile, and then show the frequency of 
downgrades in the quarter following the concurrent quarter. As shown in Figure 6, 23.20% of 
borrower-quarter observations in the bottom decile experience credit rating downgrades in the 
following quarter while only 8.47% in the top decile have downgrades. The difference in the 
frequency of downgrades between the top and bottom deciles is statistically significant with t-
value of 16.219, consistent with the notion in existing literature that bond returns capture 
changes in creditworthiness. 
To measure false positives, I require positive bond returns in two consecutive quarters. 
After merging with my covenant violation data and control variable data, I am left with a 
sample of 10,059 borrower-quarter observations. However, only 94 observations in the sample 
experience debt covenant violations, suggesting that false positives captured by bond returns 
are also a rare event. Table 14 reports the regression results of the alternative measure. The 
coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP in the Heckman, Firthlogit and probit regressions 
remain significantly negative, supporting my primary results that frozen-on-request GAAP 




6.5 Alternative Cutoff to Identify the Negative Stock Price Shock 
My measure of false negatives, Num_Month, equals the number of months between the 
first negative stock price shock defined as less than −28% monthly abnormal return and the 
first covenant violation following the shock if covenant violations occur. If covenant violations 
do not occur, Num_Month is the number of months between the first negative stock price shock 
and the sample ending or loan maturity. Following Zhang (2008), the cutoff, −28%, equals two 
standard deviations lower than the mean. There is a trade-off in the choice of the cutoff. The 
absolute value of the cutoff should be large enough to capture the deteriorating creditworthiness 
and also small enough to avoid a small sample size. I choose 2.5 standard deviations lower than 
the mean, namely −35% of monthly abnormal return, as an alternative cutoff to identify the 
negative stock price shock and then estimate the effect on false negatives based on the 
alternative cutoff. 
Table 15 reports the results of false negatives using the alternative cutoff. The 
coefficients on Frozen-on-Request GAAP are significantly negative across the six columns, 
consistent with the primary results shown in Table 7 that compared to frozen and floating 
GAAP, frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in reducing false negatives. 
6.6 Selection Model Robustness Test – Multicollinearity 
To correct for potential self-selection bias, I employ Heckman selection models where 
multicollinearity may exist after including Inverse Mills Ratio. Following Lennox et al. (2012), 
I implement two robustness tests of multicollinearity. First, I sequentially estimate the outcome 
model with one independent variable omitted each time and find no significant changes in 
results. Second, I calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each outcome regression 
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and find that none of the VIFs are larger than 2.69, which is lower than the cutoff point of 10. 
The evidence suggests that multicollinearity is not a severe concern in my tests.  
6.7 Determinant Model of Frozen-on-Request GAAP Using A Switching Sample 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, 184 borrowers in my regression sample change the type 
of GAAP provision from frozen or floating GAAP to frozen-on-request GAAP. This switching 
sample might provide a useful group to investigate the determinants of frozen-on-request 
GAAP. I report the results of the determinant model using the switching sample in Table 16. 
Considering the upward trend in borrowers’ size over time, I replace Firm Size with Firm 
Size/Lead Arranger Size, a ratio of borrowers’ size to the average size of lead arrangers. The 
coefficient on R&D is significantly negative at the 5% level, suggesting that borrowers facing 
higher uncertainty are less likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In summary, I find that frozen-on-request GAAP becomes less useful when the interest 
conflicts between borrowers and lenders increase during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and 
when borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences towards GAAP changes. I also find 
a significant difference in the reduction of false negatives between two types of frozen-on-
request GAAP, highlighting the advantages of frozen-on-request GAAP in facilitating 
renegotiations. The evidence reported in this chapter also strengthens my primary results in 
Chapter 5 by using an alternative measure of false positives, using an alternative cutoff to 
identify the negative stock price shock, using loan spreads to measure debt contracting 






This dissertation focuses on the GAAP provisions that specify the treatment of GAAP 
changes in debt contracts. By collecting a sample of 18,923 private debt contracts issued from 
1994 to 2017, I report an increase and current dominance of frozen-on-request GAAP, an under-
researched type of GAAP provisions relative to frozen and floating GAAP. Motivated by its 
significant increase, I explore whether frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in dealing with 
the impact of GAAP changes on covenant calculations than frozen and floating GAAP. To 
mitigate the concern on self-selection bias from the choice of GAAP provision types, I employ 
Heckman’s (1979) selection model.  
In the determinant model of frozen-on-request GAAP, I find that lenders with higher 
reputation are more likely to use frozen-on-request GAAP, suggesting their preference towards 
frozen-on-request GAAP; that borrowers with larger size and lower credit risk are more likely 
to use floating GAAP; that borrowers with more complex financial reporting are less likely to 
use frozen-on-request GAAP, implying that the cost of keeping multiple sets of accounting 
books is an important consideration when choosing the type of GAAP provisions; and that the 
renegotiation costs also matter evidenced by the concave relation between the number of 
lenders and the use of frozen-on-request GAAP. 
In the outcome model, I use false positives (i.e., Type I error of covenant violations) 
and false negatives (i.e., Type II error of covenant violations) to measure the effect of GAAP 
provision on covenant calculations. I find lower false positives and false negatives under 
frozen-on-request GAAP after controlling for self-selection bias, suggesting that compared to 
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frozen and floating GAAP, frozen-on-request GAAP is more useful in solving the impact of 
GAAP changes and therefore improving debt contracting efficiency. I also find that the 
reductions in false positives and false negatives under frozen-on-request GAAP are more 
evident when significant accounting changes relevant to financial covenants occur and when 
compared with unconditionally frozen GAAP, consistent with its advantages in incorporating 
and excluding GAAP changes and in reducing renegotiation costs. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature of GAAP provisions in debt contracts by 
investigating the efficiency of frozen-on-request GAAP as well as providing new evidence on 
its determinants. More broadly, by showing the role of accounting changes in improving debt 
contracting efficiency, this dissertation can shed new light on the literature of contracting 
efficiency role of accounting information. My findings should also be of interest to practitioners.  
An important caveat in interpreting my results is that I use only debt contracts with 
maturities of more than five years as my regression samples. As GAAP changes could be 
rationally anticipated by borrowers and lenders at the initiation of short-term debt contracts, 
my results may not be generalizable to short-term debt contracts. Another important limitation 
is the difficulty to collect the post-initiation data on frozen-on-request GAAP such as who 
requests a freeze. 
In the future, I plan to survey borrowers and lenders to further understand the 
determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP. Investigating the real effects of frozen-on-request 
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Examples of Contracting Practices 
Example 1 Frozen-on-request GAAP provision with renegotiation.  
A credit agreement of Abbott Laboratories dated as of December 13, 2016. 
Accounting Terms. Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, all accounting terms not specifically 
defined herein shall be construed in accordance with, and all financial data (including financial 
calculations) required to be submitted pursuant to this Agreement shall be prepared in conformity with, 
generally accepted accounting principles as in effect in the United States from time to time 
(“GAAP”).  If at any time any change in GAAP would affect the calculation of any covenant set forth 
herein and either the Borrower or the Required Lenders shall so request, the Administrative Agent, the 
Lenders and the Borrower shall negotiate in good faith to amend such covenant to preserve the original 
intent thereof in light of such change in GAAP (subject to the approval of the Required 
Lenders); provided that, until so amended, (i) such covenant shall continue to be calculated in 
accordance with GAAP prior to such change and (ii) the Borrower shall provide to the Administrative 
Agent and the Lenders, concurrently with the delivery of any financial statements or reports with respect 
to such covenant, statements setting forth a reconciliation between calculations of such covenant made 
before and after giving effect to such change in GAAP. 
 
Example 2 Frozen-on-request GAAP provision without renegotiation. 54 
A credit agreement of Signal Peak Energy, LLC. dated as of October 22, 2010. 
GAAP means generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America.  
Accounting Terms GAAP. Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, all terms of an accounting or 
financial nature shall be construed in accordance with GAAP, as in effect from time to time provided 
that, if the Borrowers notify the Administrative Agent that the Borrowers request an amendment to any 
provision hereof to eliminate the effect of any change occurring after the date hereof in GAAP or in the 
application thereof on the operation of such provision (including the effects of the application or 
discontinuance of the application of accounting for the effects of regulation to all or any portion of 
either Borrowers operations), or if the Administrative Agent notifies the Borrowers that the Required 
Lenders request an amendment to any provision hereof for such purpose, regardless of whether any 
such notice is given before or after such change in GAAP or in the application thereof, then such 
provision shall be interpreted on the basis of GAAP as in effect and applied immediately before such 
change shall have become effective until such notice shall have been withdrawn or such provision 
amended in accordance herewith.  
 
Example 3 Unconditionally frozen GAAP provision. 
A loan and security agreement of American Railcar Industries, INC. dated as of January 24, 2006. 
Accounting Terms and Determinations. Unless otherwise defined or specified herein, all accounting 
terms used in this Agreement shall be construed in accordance with GAAP, applied on a basis consistent 
in all material respects with the Financial Statements delivered to the Agent on or before the Closing 
 




Date. All accounting determinations for purposes of determining compliance with Article VIII shall be 
made in accordance with GAAP as in effect on the Closing Date and applied on a basis consistent in all 
material respects with the audited Financial Statements delivered to the Agent on or before the Closing 
Date. The Financial Statements required to be delivered hereunder from and after the Closing Date, and 
all financial records, shall be maintained in accordance with GAAP. If GAAP shall change from the 
basis used in preparing the audited Financial Statements delivered to the Agent on or before the Closing 
Date, the Compliance Certificates required to be delivered pursuant to Section 7.1 shall include 
calculations setting forth the adjustments necessary to demonstrate how the Borrower is in compliance 
with the Financial Covenants based upon GAAP as in effect on the Closing Date.  
 
Example 4 Frozen GAAP with renegotiation provision. 
A term loan agreement of Washington Prime Group, L. P. dated as of December 10, 2015. 
“GAAP” means generally accepted accounting principles set forth in the opinions and pronouncements 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Accounting Principles Board and Financial 
Accounting Standards Board or in such other statements by such other entity as may be in general use 
by significant segments of the accounting profession as in effect on the Closing Date (unless otherwise 
specified herein as in effect on another date or dates). Change in Accounting Principles. If any change 
in the accounting principles used in the preparation of the most recent financial statements referred to 
in Sections 8.1 or 8.2 are hereafter required or permitted by the rules, regulations, pronouncements and 
opinions of the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (or successors thereto or agencies with similar functions) and are adopted by any General 
Partner or the Borrower, as applicable, with the agreement of its independent certified public 
accountants and such changes result in a change in the method of calculation of any of the covenants, 
standards or terms found in Article X, the parties hereto agree to enter into negotiations in order to 
amend such provisions so as to equitably reflect such changes with the desired result that the criteria 
for evaluating compliance with such covenants, standards and terms by the Borrower shall be the same 
after such changes as if such changes had not been made; provided, however, no change in GAAP that 
would affect the method of calculation of any of the covenants, standards or terms shall be given effect 
in such calculations until such provisions are amended, in a manner satisfactory to the Administrative 
Agent and the Borrower, to so reflect such change in accounting principles. 
 
Example 5 Floating GAAP provision. 
A loan agreement of BB&T dated as of May 13, 2015 
“GAAP” shall mean generally accepted accounting principles as established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board or the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, as amended 






Collateral An indicator variable that equals one if the contract is secured by 
collateral, and zero otherwise, from DealScan. 
Conservatism The C-Score (λ1 + λ2Size + λ3M/B + λ4Leverage) of Khan and Watts (2009), 
where the coefficients are derived from the annual cross-sectional regression 
model as follows: Ei=β1 + β2Di + Ri(µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3M/Bi + µ4Leveragei) + 
DiRi(λ1 + λ2Sizei + λ3M/Bi + λ4Leveragei) + (δ1Sizei + δ2M/Bi + δ3Leveragei 
+ δ4DiSizei + δ5DiM/Bi + δ6DiLeveragei) + εi. 
Covenant Tightness  The aggregate probability of covenant violations of loan packages initiated 
between 1996 and 2015, from Demerjian and Owens (2016). The probability 
is calculated using the logic of the Murfin (2012) measure that combines the 
initial slack of each covenant, the volatility of financial matrixes underlying 
each covenant and the correlation among those financial matrixes. The 
definitions of financial matrixes are the standard covenant definitions that 
minimize measurement error. 
Credit Rating Borrowers’ bond rating (defined as one for the highest rated loan to 16 for 
the lowest rated loan), and zero otherwise. 
Cumret  Cumulative negative stock returns equal the buy-and-hold return of all 
negative price shocks where monthly return is less than -28%. For example, 
if a firm experiences two negative price shocks during the facility initiation 
date and the sample ending, then the cumulative negative stock returns equal 
the sum of the sizes of the two shocks. 
Dividend  An indicator variable that equals one for dividend paying borrowers, and 
zero otherwise. 
False Positives_1 An indicator variable that equals one if a borrower that has positive stock 
returns adjusted by value-weighted return in two consecutive quarters 
reports a debt covenant violation in the SEC filings, and zero otherwise. 
False Positives_2 An indicator variable that equals one if a borrower that has credit rating 
upgrades in the year prior to debt covenant violations, and zero otherwise. 
False Positives_3 An indicator variable that equals one if a borrower that has positive bond 
returns in two consecutive quarters reports a debt covenant violation in the 
SEC filings, and zero otherwise. 
Financial Complexity The number of words in 10-K divided by 1000. 
Firm Size  The log of market value of equity. 
Floating GAAP An indicator variable that equals one if a GAAP provision does not include 
the terms (or the variation of the terms) of Frozen GAAP and Frozen-on-








Variable Descriptions (Continued) 
Variable Description 
Frozen GAAP An indicator variable that equals one if a GAAP provision includes the terms 
(or the variation of the terms): “GAAP in effect on Jan”, “in effect as of the 
Closing Date”, “in effect on or before the Effective Date”, “GAAP as in 
effect at the most recent”, “GAAP as applied to statements dated”, “prior to 
the delivery of the first financial statement”, “no such change shall”,  
“GAAP had not occurred”, “without reflecting such change”, “GAAP shall 




An indicator variable that equals one if a GAAP provision includes the terms 
(or the variation of the terms): “at the request of either the Borrower or the 
Required Lenders”, “following notice either from”, “if the Borrower or the 
Required Lenders request”, “either the Borrowers or the Required Lenders 
shall request”, “if Borrower notifies…or if the Required Lenders notify”, 
“Borrower may by notice to Required Lenders, or Required Lenders may by 
notice to Borrower”, etc., and zero otherwise. 
Institutional Facility 
Indicator 
An indicator variable that equals one if the facility is a term loan tranche B 
or higher, and zero otherwise, from DealScan. 
Lender Reputation An indicator variable equal to one if the lead arranger is one of the top ten 
lenders reported in Ross (2010), and zero otherwise. 
Leverage  The ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to total assets. 
Loan Size  The natural logarithm of the loan amount, from DealScan. 
Month_to_Maturity  The natural logarithm of the number of months between the first negative 
stock price shock (or the data date in Equation 3) and loan maturity. 
No Rating An indicator variable equal to one if the borrower is not rated, and zero 
otherwise. 
Num_Covenant The number of debt covenants, from DealScan. 
Num_GAAP_Change The lagged number of GAAP changes announced in the FASB’s website. 
Num_Lender The natural logarithm of the number of loan lenders, from DealScan. 
Num_Lender_Sq The square of the natural logarithm of the number of loan lenders. 
Num_Month  The natural logarithm of the number of months between the first negative 
stock price shock defined as less than -28% monthly return and the first 
covenant violation following the price shock if covenant violations occur or 
the sample ending or loan maturity if no covenant violation occur. 
R&D The research and development expense scaled by total revenue. 
Rating Estimated credit quality based on the predicted value of Barth, Hodder, and 
Stubben (2008)’s model. 
Revolver An indicator variable that equals one if the facility’s type is revolver, and 
zero otherwise, from DealScan. 





Variable Descriptions (Continued) 
Variable Description 
Spread The amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar 
drawn down, from DealScan. 
Std_Cash Flows  Standard deviation of annual operating cash flows in the past 5 years. 
Tobin’s Q The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total liabilities 
to the book value of total assets. 
Unreliable FV An indicator variable equal to one if a borrower’s ratio of Level 2 and 3 
assets and liabilities to total financial assets and liabilities 
((aol2+aul3+lol2+lul3)/(aqpl1+aol2+aul3+lqpl1+lol2+lul3)) reported in the 
first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 2007 is higher than the 
median value, and otherwise zero. 
Volatility of Stock 
Price 
The difference between the highest stock price and the lowest price divided 



















Debt Covenant Violation Search Terms in Nini et al. (2012) 
“in violation of covenant”, “in violation of a covenant”, “in default of covenant”, “in default of 
a covenant”, “in technical violation of covenant”, “in technical violation of a covenant”, “in 
violation of financial covenant”, “in violation of a financial covenant”, “in default of financial 
covenant”, “in default of a financial covenant”, “in technical violation of financial covenant”, 
“in technical violation of a financial covenant”, “in technical default of financial covenant”, 
“in technical default of a financial covenant”, “not in compliance”, “out of compliance”, 






















The Trends of the Types of GAAP Provisions 
Panel A. The Trends of the Three Types of GAAP Provisions 
 
Panel B. The Trends of the Two Types of Frozen-on-Request GAAP  
 
 
This figure shows the trend in contracting practice in terms of GAAP provisions. I collect 18,923 private debt 
contracts issued between 1994 and 2017 from the Edgar. Based on the GAAP provisions, I classify those contracts 
into three categories, frozen-on-request GAAP, frozen GAAP, and floating GAAP. Panel A presents the trends in 
the three types of GAAP provisions. In this panel, floating GAAP experienced a sharp drop but frozen GAAP had 
an abrupt increase in 1997. The opposing directions might be explained by the anticipation of the adoption of 
SFAS 133 (Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities) in June 1998. Within frozen-on-request 
GAAP, there are two types. In one type renegotiations are necessary when either party requests a freeze (i.e., 
frozen-on-request with renegotiation) and in the other type renegotiations are not necessary (i.e., frozen-on-request 



























Frozen-on-Request GAAP’s Advantages before Renegotiations 
 Frozen Floating Frozen-on-Request 
Result Result Borrower Lender Result 








Tighten 1 Exclude Incorporate Reject Accept Exclude Not reduce false negatives Yes 





Tighten 3 Exclude Incorporate Reject Reject Exclude Reduce false positives No  
Loosen 4 Exclude Incorporate Accept Reject Exclude Reduce false negatives Yes 
 
This figure shows the exclusion and incorporation of GAAP changes under the three types of GAAP provisions before contract renegotiations. Although frozen-on-request 
GAAP would exclude GAAP changes beneficial to debt contracting efficiency but tightening covenants, it remains more useful in reducing false positives and false negatives 










Frozen-on-Request GAAP’s Advantages in Reducing Renegotiation Costs and Facilitating Renegotiations 
 No Conflict 
Conflict 




Less likely to renegotiate; 
Renegotiate 
Frozen Renegotiate No Less likely to renegotiate 
Floating No Renegotiate Less likely to renegotiate 
 
This figure shows frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages in reducing renegotiation costs and facilitating renegotiations. When both borrowers and lenders prefer new GAAP, 
no renegotiation is needed under frozen-on-request GAAP and floating GAAP, and renegotiations are required under frozen GAAP; and when both prefer old GAAP, under 
frozen-on-request GAAP the necessity of renegotiation depends on the types of frozen-on-request GAAP, and renegotiations are necessary under floating GAAP but are not 
required under frozen GAAP. The renegotiation outcome under the two scenarios is to restore ex post efficiency. Therefore, I argue that frozen-on-request GAAP can restore 
efficiency at a lower cost when borrowers and lenders have the same preference towards GAAP changes. When borrowers and lenders have conflicting preferences, under 
frozen and floating GAAP the two parties are less likely to enter into renegotiations because either can reject renegotiations and hold up the other. Under one type of frozen-
on-request GAAP the two parties shall enter into renegotiations and therefore frozen-on-request GAAP can facilitate renegotiations. However, the renegotiation outcome in this 
scenario is not necessarily restore efficiency because borrowers can abuse the renegotiations to push lenders to agree to reject GAAP changes beneficial to contracting efficiency 











The Effect of the Two Types of Frozen-on-Request GAAP 
Panel A: The effect on false positives 
 Frozen-on-Request 
Frozen Floating Effect on False Positives 





2 Both prefer new GAAP Reduce false positives Not renegotiate Not renegotiate Renegotiate Not renegotiate 
3 Both prefer old GAAP Reduce false positives Not renegotiate Renegotiate Not renegotiate Renegotiate 
 
Panel B: The effect on false negatives 
 Frozen-on-Request 
Frozen Floating Effect on False Positives 





1 Conflicting Preferences Not reduce false negatives 
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
Renegotiate  
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
4 Conflicting Preferences Reduce false negatives 
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
Renegotiate 
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
Less likely to 
renegotiate 
 
This figure demonstrates the analyses of the two types of frozen-on-request GAAP by combing Figure 1 and Figure 2. In scenarios 2 and 3, frozen-on-request 
GAAP without renegotiation can save renegotiation costs and therefore is more useful in reducing false positives. In scenarios 1 and 4, frozen-on-request GAAP 



























Facility starting date 
Date of the first negative 
stock price shock 
First covenant violation date 
or 
Sample ending date/Maturity 




The Frequency of Downgrades across the Decile of Bond Returns 
Decile of the sum of 









23.20% 10.24% 7.31% 6.67% 6.67% 7.09% 6.57% 5.99% 7.34% 8.47% 
 
This figure shows the frequency of downgrades from the bottom decile of the sum of bond returns in one preceding quarter and the concurrent quarter to the top decile. The 
frequency of downgrades is highest in the bottom decile and is the second highest in the bottom 20%, supporting the notion that bond returns have the ability to capture changes 






















Sample Selection Criteria Sample Size 
All Exhibit 10s of forms 10-K, 10-Q, or 
8-K filed to the SEC during Jan 1994 to 
Dec 2017  
 
870,907 Exhibit 10 files 
Restrict to Exhibit 10s containing the 
terms “credit agreement”, “loan 
agreement”, or “loan and security 
agreement”; the words “GAAP” or 
“Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles”; and “financial covenants” or 
“negative covenants” 
 
45,639 Exhibit 10 files 
Drop short Exhibit 10s containing less 
than 7,000 words 
 
43,460 Exhibit 10 files 
Require that the first 3,072 characters of 
each Exhibit 10 contain the terms “credit 
agreement”, “loan agreement”, or “loan 
and security agreement” 
26,855 Exhibit 10 files 
Drop Exhibit 10s that don’t contain 
enough information on the GAAP 
provision design 
24,026 Exhibit 10 files 
Merge with Compustat via CIK identifier 18,923 Exhibit 10 files 
Restrict to non-financial U.S. firms55 16,835 Exhibit 10 files 
Merge with DealScan manually and 
restrict to loans with more than five-year 
maturity56 
6,927 facilities for 2,144 unique firms 
Require non-missing values of regression 
variables in Equation (1) 
5,605 facilities for 1,716 unique firms 
 
 
55 The main reason is to avoid duplications. A borrower reports a debt contract in its SEC filings, and at the same 
time the lender (most of lenders are financial firms) may report it as a commitment letter. 
56 The sample size reduces significantly for the following reasons: 1. The restriction on maturity; 2. Sample 
duplications caused by borrowers’ multiple reports; 3. A valid DealScan-Compustat link based on company 




Frequency of Private Debt Contracts by Filing Years 






1994 6 0 
1995 14 0 
1996 28 12 
1997 44 16 
1998 50 7 
1999 55 6 
2000 228 22 
2001 661 70 
2002 915 97 
2003 1015 126 
2004 1287 367 
2005 1346 447 
2006 1190 370 
2007 1112 435 
2008 841 163 
2009 845 71 
2010 1272 228 
2011 1494 630 
2012 1216 467 
2013 1217 545 
2014 1349 534 
2015 1286 527 
2016 1269 441 
2017 179 25 
Total 18,923 5,605 
 
This table presents the sample distribution of private debt contracts by filing years. I extract debt contracts issued 
between 1994 and 2017 from the Edgar and require that (1) agreements include the terms “GAAP” or “Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles”, and “financial covenants” or “negative covenants”; (2) agreements contain 
more than 7,000 words; (3) agreements contain enough information on GAAP provision designs to judge the 
GAAP provision types; (4) agreements can be linked to Compustat via CIK identifier. Columns 1 and 2 show the 

















Panel A: Equation 1 – Determinant Model 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Frozen-on-Request 
GAAP 
5,605 0.642 0 1 1 0 1 0.480 
Frozen GAAP 5,605 0.258 0 0 1 0 1 0.437 
Floating GAAP 5,605 0.101 0 0 0 0 1 0.301 
R&D 5,605 0.020 0 0 0.016 0 0.230 0.043 
Tobin’s Q 5,605 1.766 1.200 1.498 2.005 0.786 6.066 0.900 
Volatility  5,605 0.559 0.335 0.471 0.699 0.162 1.841 0.321 
Conservatism 5,605 0.392 0.003 0.372 0.731 −1.263 2.390 0.641 
Firm Size 5,605 7.460 6.468 7.449 8.447 4.066 11.004 1.480 
Collateral 5,605 0.569 0 1 1 0 1 0.495 
Num_Lender 5,605 2.004 1.609 2.079 2.565 0 4.727 0.853 
Num_Lender_Sq 5,605 4.732 2.590 4.324 6.579 0 13.039 3.114 
Num_Covenant 5,605 1.641 0 2 2 0 7 1.296 
Num_GAAP_Change 5,605 10.855 4 7 17 1 29 8.373 
Credit Rating 5,605 3.853 0 0 10 0 15 5.124 
No Rating 5,605 0.622 0 1 1 0 1 0.485 
Loan/Asset 5,605 0.221 0.081 0.158 0.289 0.009 1.140 0.208 
Revolver 5,605 0.646 0 1 1 0 1 0.478 
Financial Complexity 5,605 47.042 32.281 41.642 54.912 13.544 150.9 23.567 
Lender Reputation 5,605 0.851 1 1 1 0 1 0.356 
 
Panel B: Equation 2 – False Positives Using the Positive Stock Return Sample 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Frozen-on-
Request GAAP 
10,503 0.653 0 1 1 0 1 0.476 
Frozen GAAP 10,503 0.239 0 0 0 0 1 0.426 
Floating GAAP 10,503 0.109 0 0 0 0 1 0.311 
Violation 10,503 0.016 0 0 0 0 1 0.124 
Firm Size 10,503 7.607 6.626 7.665 8.598 3.588 11.427 1.521 
Leverage 10,503 0.328 0.186 0.296 0.428 0 0.933 0.204 
ROA 10,503 0.046 0.021 0.049 0.080 −0.244 0.217 0.065 
Dividend 10,503 0.556 0 1 1 0 1 0.497 
Std_Cash Flows 10,503 141.951 21.613 52.622 132.886 2.264 1830.507 269.827 
Covenant 
Tightness 
10,503 0.274 0.004 0.041 0.602 0 1 0.384 
Rating 10,503 −4.194 −5.075 −4.218 −3.394 −7.077 −0.555 1.277 
Collateral 10,503 0.566 0 1 1 0 1 0.496 
 
Panel C: Equation 2 – False Positives Using the Credit Rating Upgrade Sample 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Frozen-on-
Request GAAP 
1,700 0.638 0 1 1 0 1 0.481 
Frozen GAAP 1,700 0.251 0 0 1 0 1 0.434 
Floating GAAP 1,700 0.111 0 0 0 0 1 0.314 
Violation 1,700 0.047 0 0 0 0 1 0.212 
Firm Size 1,700 8.033 7.173 8.082 9.001 3.626 11.914 1.504 
Leverage 1,700 0.389 0.246 0.354 0.488 0.053 1.000 0.206 
ROA 1,700 0.031 0.011 0.034 0.064 −0.414 0.231 0.080 
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Panel C: Equation 2 – False Positives Using the Credit Rating Upgrade Sample 
(Continued) 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Dividend 1,700 0.629 0 1 1 0 1 0.483 
Std_Cash Flows 1,700 261.091 51.123 107.078 232.436 10.132 3298.26 475.078 
Covenant 
Tightness 
1,700 0.287 0.002 0.045 0.642 0 1 0.391 
Rating 1,700 −4.658 −5.682 −4.852 −3.728 −7.682 −0.841 1.422 
Collateral 1,700 0.579 0 1 1 0 1 0.494 
 
Panel D: Equation 3 – False Negatives 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Frozen-on-Request 
GAAP 
1,322 0.567 0 1 1 0 1 0.496 
Frozen GAAP 1,322 0.293 0 0 1 0 1 0.456 
Floating GAAP 1,322 0.140 0 0 0 0 1 0.347 
Log(Num_Month) 1,310 2.856 2.316 3.200 3.778 −3.401 4.724 1.187 
Num_Month 1,322 27.543 9.7 24.4 43.733 0 112.667 20.896 
Cumret 1,322 −0.603 −0.722 −0.392 −0.326 −2.658 −0.280 0.396 
Firm Size 1,322 6.043 4.784 6.238 7.500 0.815 10.352 2.005 
Leverage 1,322 0.432 0.229 0.380 0.582 0 1.463 0.285 
ROA 1,322 −0.053 −0.077 0.001 0.037 −0.921 0.235 0.180 
Rating 1,322 −3.060 −4.220 −3.372 −2.170 −7.186 13.983 2.019 
Loan Size 1,322 18.939 18.133 19.114 19.868 14.935 21.822 1.377 
Month-to-Maturity 1,322 16.237 0.533 1.033 30.533 0.033 142.033 21.870 
Num_Covenant 1,322 2 1 2 3 0 6 1.456 
 
Panel E: Equation 4 – Loan Spreads 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max s.d. 
Frozen-on-Request 
GAAP 
5,373 0.646 0 1 1 0 1 0.478 
Frozen GAAP 5,373 0.259 0 0 1 0 1 0.438 
Floating GAAP 5,373 0.095 0 0 0 0 1 0.294 
Spread 5,373 199.218 125 175 250 25 675 117.460 
Maturity 5,373 63.774 60 60 60 60 181 63.774 
Revolver 5,373 0.653 0 1 1 0 1 0.476 
Loan/Asset 5,373 0.225 0.084 0.161 0.293 0.009 1.196 0.212 
Leverage 5,373 0.302 0.145 0.278 0.422 0 1.849 0.216 
ROA 5,373 0.042 0.018 0.044 0.076 −0.924 0.679 0.080 
Rating 5,373 −4.204 −5.131 −4.251 −3.359 −7.077 −0.555 1.319 
Num_Covenant 5,373 1.675 0 2 2 0 7 1.290 
 
This table reports the number of observations (N), mean, 25th percentile, median,75th percentile, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation (s.d.) for variables used in my main regressions. See the Appendix II for 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.166 0.229 0.068 0.102 
N. of Obs 5,605 4,161 5,013 5,605 
 
This table reports the determinants of GAAP provision types. The dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the GAAP provision type is frozen-on-request or frozen GAAP; in Column 2 is an 
indicator variable that equals one for frozen-on-request GAAP, and zero for floating GAAP; in Column 3 is an 
indicator variable that equals one for frozen-on-request GAAP, and zero for frozen GAAP; and in Column 4 is an 
indicator variable that equals one for frozen-on-request GAAP, and zero for frozen and floating GAAP. P-value 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate 




The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on False Positives – Positive Stock Returns 
 False Positives_1 
 



























































































































































































          
Wald X-sq 2,304.27 166.55  2,696.97 163.18  2,889.64 247.49  
Pseudo R-sq   0.164   0.122   0.153 
Total Obs 8,432 7,996 7,996 10,448 9,361 9,361 12,026 10,503 10,503 
 
This table reports the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives using the positive stock return sample. The dependent variable across the nine columns is False 
Positives_1. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables 






The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on False Positives – Credit Rating Upgrades 
 False Positives_2 
 



























































































































































































          
Wald X-sq 444.65 60.25  555.91 70.13  605.45 77.76  
Pseudo R-sq   0.162   0.167   0.136 
Total Obs 1,320 1,273 1,273 1,717 1,512 1,512 1,952 1,700 1,700 
 
This table reports the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives using the credit rating upgrade sample. The dependent variable across the nine columns is False 
Positives_2. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables 




The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on False Negatives 



















































































































































































































    
          
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 0.423 0.439 0.440 0.440 0.427 0.436    
Pseudo R-sq       0.349 0.370 0.350 
Total Obs 902 926 1,123 1,127 1,302 1,310 934 1,137 1,322 
 
This table reports the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false negatives. The dependent variable across the first six columns is Log(Num_Month) and in columns 7 to 9 is 
90 
 
Num_Month. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables 

































Relevance to covenants 
Criteria to select affected 
firms 
121 
Accounting for the 
Impairment of Long-
Lived Assets and for 
Long-Lived Assets to 
Be Disposed Of 
1995-12-31 
Affects assets and losses, 
and therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have a ratio of 
PP&E to total assets 
greater than the Compustat 
median and have returns in 





Affects liabilities, equity, 
and expenses, and 
therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have a ratio of 
common stock reserved 
for conversion to stock 
options to total common 
stock outstanding greater 
than the Compustat 
median. 
123R Share-Based Payment 2005-06-15 
Affects liabilities, equity, 
and expenses, and 
therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have a ratio of 
stock option expense to 







income and other 
comprehensive income, 
and therefore affects 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have larger than 
zero accumulated other 
comprehensive income. 
141 Business Combinations 2001-07-01 
Affects assets and 
liabilities, and therefore 
affects capital covenants. 
Firms that have greater 
than median total assets, 
and within the above 
median, firms that have 
asset growth over last 3 
years in the top quartile, 
and in the top quartile 
firms that have a ratio of 
goodwill to total assets 
greater than the Compustat 
median. 
141R Business Combinations 2008-12-15 
Affects assets and 
liabilities, and therefore 
affects capital covenants. 
Firms that have greater 
than median total assets, 
and within the above 
median, firms that have 
asset growth over last 3 
years in the top quartile, 
and in the top quartile 
firms that have a ratio of 
goodwill to total assets 
greater than the Compustat 
median. 
142 
Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets 
2001-12-15 
Affects assets and 
expenses, and therefore 
affects both capital 
covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have non-zero 
goodwill and the one-year 




TABLE 8  




Relevance to covenants 
Criteria to select affected 
firms 
144 
Accounting for the 
Impairment or Disposal 
of Long-Lived Assets 
2001-12-15 
Affects assets and losses, 
and therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have PP&E, or 




Accounting for Costs 
Associated with Exit or 
Disposal Activities 
2002-12-15 
Affects liabilities, and 
therefore affects capital 
covenants. 
Firms that have a ratio of 
restructuring costs to total 
sales greater than the 
Compustat median. 
150 
Accounting for Certain 
Financial Instruments 
with Characteristics of 
both Liabilities and 
Equity 
2003-05-31 
Affects liabilities, equity, 
and assets (in some 
circumstances), and 
therefore affects capital 
covenants. 
Firms that have greater 
than zero redeemable 
preferred stock. 
151 Inventory Costs 2005-06-15 
Affects assets and 
expenses, and therefore 
affects both capital 
covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have a ratio of 
inventory to total assets 






Affects assets, liabilities, 
gains, and losses, and 
therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have non-zero 




for Defined Benefit 
Pension and Other 
Postretirement Plans 
2006-12-15 
Affects assets, liabilities, 
and other comprehensive 
income, and therefore 
affects both capital 
covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have non-zero 
value of pension and 
retirement expense. 
159 
The Fair Value Option 
for Financial Assets and 
Financial Liabilities. 
2007-11-15 
Affects assets, liabilities, 
gains, and losses, and 
therefore affects both 
capital covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have non-zero 








Affects equity and 
income, and therefore 
affects both capital 
covenants and 
performance covenants. 
Firms that have larger than 
zero minority interest on 
the balance sheet. 
 
This table reports 15 SFAS that are most relevant to financial covenants over my research period. I use three 
criteria to select SFAS. First, SFAS should not be for financial industries such as SFAS 134 and 138, about 
disclosures such as SFAS 131 and 132, for non-profit firms, nor for nonpublic firms; Second, SFAS should affect 
financial covenants; Third, it must be feasible to identify affected firms. For each SFAS, I identify its effective 









The Effect of the Variation in Standard Setting Activity 
 False Positives_1 False Positives_2 Log(Num_Month) 








































































































































       
Wald X-sq 774.30 1,814.18 44.64 335.60   
Adjusted R-sq     0.533 0.395 
Total Obs 4,551 7,608 752 1,154 153 597 
 
This table reports the effect of variation in standard setting activity. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is False Positives_1; in columns 3 and 4 is False Positives_2; 
and in columns 5 and 6 is Log(Num_Month). P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable 







The Effect of the Two Types of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on False Positives and False Negatives 





















































































































































       
Wald X-sq 721.93 1,321.81 63.47 406.35   
Adjusted R-sq     0.453 0.491 
Total Obs 6,458 6,590 936 1,160 908 876 
 
This table reports the effect of the two types of frozen-on-request GAAP vs. frozen and floating GAAP on false positives and false negatives. The dependent variable in columns 
1 and 2 is False Positives_1, in Columns 3 and 4 is False Positives_2, and in columns 5 and 6 is Log(Num_Month). P-value based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and 





The Effect of Financial Crisis 2007-2008 
 False Positives_1 
 Frozen-on-Request vs. Non-Frozen-on-Request 




































   
Wald X-sq 2,405.27 359.17 
Adjusted R-sq   
Total Obs 9,952 2,074 
 
This table reports the results of the effect of financial crisis 2007-2008 on frozen-on-request GAAP’s advantages 
in reducing false positives. The dependent variable is False Positives_1. P-value based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous 





























The Effect of Borrowers’ and Lenders’ Conflicting Preferences towards GAAP Changes – SFAS 159 





















































































































































       
Wald X-sq 32.18 15.10 10.36 7.19   
Adjusted R-sq     0.435 0.400 
Total Obs 1,117 1,040 183 172 106 90 
 
This table reports the effect of borrowers’ and lenders’ conflicting preferences towards GAAP changes using the setting of SFAS 159. When borrowers have reliable fair value 
measure (i.e., the ratio of Level 2 and 3 assets and liabilities to total financial assets and liabilities reported in the first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 2007 is lower 
than the median value), both borrowers and lenders prefer the adoption of SFAS 159; when borrowers have unreliable fair value measure (i.e., the ratio is higher than the median 
value), then borrowers prefer to adopt the GAAP changes but lenders prefer not. I use a sample of firms having financial assets and financial liabilities over the three years after 
the adoption of SFAS 159. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is False Positives_1, in Columns 3 and 4 is False Positives_2, and in columns 5 and 6 is Log(Num_Month). 
P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized 




























The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on Loan Spreads 
 Spread 
 
























































































































       
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 0.544 0.516 0.530 0.526 0.538 0.521 
Total Obs 4,831 4,860 3,979 3,982 5,370 5,373 
 
This table reports the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on loan spreads. The dependent variable across the six columns Spread. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and 





The Effect of Frozen-on-Request GAAP on False Positives – Positive Bond Returns 
 False Positives_3 
 



























































































































































































          
Wald X-sq 1,871.78 67.23  2,053.90 66.06  2,186.67 84.72  
Pseudo R-sq   0.096   0.069   0.078 
Total Obs 7,534 7,534 7,534 8,734 8,734 8,734 10,059 10,059 10,059 
 
This table reports the effect of frozen-on-request GAAP on false positives using the positive bond returns sample. The dependent variable across the nine columns is False 
Positives_3. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables 






Alternative Cutoff to Measure False Negatives 
 Log(Num_Month) 
































































































































       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-sq 0.474 0.478 0.453 0.467 0.456 0.456 
Pseudo R-sq       
Total Obs 542 555 671 678 797 802 
 
This table reports the results of false negatives using an alternative cutoff, -35%, to identify the first negative stock price shock. P-value based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and 




Determinants of Frozen-on-Request GAAP Using A Switching Sample 
 Frozen-on-Request=1 &  
Non-Frozen-on-Request=0 
Firm Size/Lead Arranger Size 6.121 
(0.339) 
Credit Rating 0.009 
(0.812) 
No Rating 0.124 
(0.774) 


















Tobin’s Q 0.019 
(0.837) 









Year FE Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.364 
N. of Obs 840 
 
This table reports the determinants of frozen-on-request GAAP using a switching sample of changing from 
frozen/floating GAAP to frozen-on-request GAAP. The dependent variable is Frozen-on-Request GAAP. P-value 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix II for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
